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[1453] 
Race and Equity in the Age of Unicorns 
LYNNISE E. PHILLIPS PANTIN† 
This Article critically examines startup culture and its legal predicates. The Article analyzes 
innovation culture as a whole and uses the downfall of Theranos to illustrate the deficiencies in 
Silicon Valley culture, centering on race and class. The Article demonstrates that the rise and fall 
of the unicorn startup Theranos and its founder, Elizabeth Holmes, is emblematic of the problem 
with the glorification and pursuit of the unicorn designation for startup ventures. The examination 
of the downfall of Theranos exposes how investors, founders, and others in Silicon Valley engage 
with each other in the context of pursuing unicorn status. The saga of Theranos lays bare how the 
wealthy and the privileged control the private financial markets and underscores the structural 
inequities within the startup ecosystem. Such a structure promotes certain types of entrepreneurs 
to the exclusion of others. Diverse and nontraditional entrepreneurs in the startup world face 
tremendous hurdles to securing financing, mentorship and media exposure. In stark contrast, 
founders like Holmes benefit from a perception of worthiness drawn from factors such as race, 
socioeconomic status, pedigree and social connections. This Article examines how the culture of 
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INTRODUCTION 
The holy grail for a startup is the achievement of the unicorn moniker: the 
billion dollar valuation on the private market.1 Silicon Valley is ground zero for 
the creation of a unicorn because of the number of influential investors, 
innovators, and businesses in the region, which is home to thousands of startup 
companies and the country’s largest technology corporations.2 The amount of 
wealth in Silicon Valley is astounding. 3  Silicon Valley has multiple 
definitions—the tangible geographic one, defined as the southern part of the San 
Francisco Bay Area, and the metaphorical one that refers to the U.S. high tech 
economic sector and other comparable sectors around the world. 4  The 
geographic region accounts for nearly half of all the venture capital in the United 
States.5 Because of its influential investors and gatekeepers, the metaphoric 
region represents a powerful private market for capital raises.6  
 
 1. The term “unicorn” was coined by Aileen Lee as a term for startups valued over $1 billion. Aileen Lee, 
Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013, 11:00 AM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-the-unicorn-club. Market research firm CB Insights found that 
there are now over 600 private companies valued at $1 billion. $1B+ Market Map: The World’s 600+ Unicorn 
Companies in One Infographic, CB INSIGHTS (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/unicorn-
startup-market-map/.  
 2. See Shobhit Seth, Why Is Silicon Valley a Startup Heaven?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/061115/why-silicon-valley-startup-heaven.asp (June 
25, 2019); see also Kimberly Amadeo, Silicon Valley, America’s Innovative Advantage, BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-silicon-valley-3305808 (Nov. 27, 2020). 
 3. According to the Brookings Institute, the metropolitan area of San Jose, California, has the third-
highest GDP per capita in the world (after Zurich, Switzerland, and Oslo, Norway). Gina Hall, San Jose Area 
Has World’s Third-Highest GDP Per Capita, Brookings Says, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Jan. 23, 2015, 3:34 
PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2015/01/23/san-jose-has-worlds-third-highest-gdp-per-
capita.html. According to the research institute Wealth-X, the percentage of “ultra high net worth individuals” 
(assets worth at least $30 million) in the San Francisco Bay Area has continued to grow each year, with an 
increase of 16.6% of ultra high net worth individuals between 2018 to 2019. WEALTH-X, WORLD ULTRA 
WEALTH REPORT 2020, at 2 (2020), https://thehometrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Wealth-X_World-
Ultra-Wealth-Report_2020.pdf. 
 4. Troy Segal, Silicon Valley, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/siliconvalley.asp 
(Oct. 27, 2020); Silicon Valley, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/silicon-valley (last 
visited May 21, 2021). 
 5. Richard Florida & Karen M. King, Spiky Venture Capital: The Geography of Venture Capital 
Investment by Metro and Zip Code, MARTIN PROSPERITY INST. (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www-
2.rotman.utoronto.ca/mpi/content/spiky-venture-capital/ (showing that San Francisco, California, accounts for 
25.26% and San Jose, California, accounts for 14.51% of venture capital in the United States); Richard Florida, 
The Extreme Geographic Inequality of High-Tech Venture Capital, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Mar. 27, 2018, 7:43 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-27/the-extreme-geographic-inequality-of-high-tech-
venture-capital (“Silicon Valley . . . currently accounts for nearly 45 percent of total venture capital investment 
in the entire United States.”). 
 6. Jim Yu, The Unforeseen Challenges of Raising Capital, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2013, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2013/12/16/the-unforeseen-challenges-of-raising-capital/ 
#1e7c2a496989; see Ray Hennessey, Elitism Has No Place in Entrepreneurship, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 18, 
2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/250831 (“[E]litism is found too often among entrepreneurs, 
particularly in tech startups. The myopia, the drive that fuels people to take risks, often creates great companies 
and great products, but it also cultivates a solipsism that assumes the work the entrepreneur is doing, and the 
way in which that work is being done, is the only important undertaking in the world.”). 
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The paradox of Silicon Valley is that it is a community built on the ideals 
of pursuing innovation and of challenging the status quo, but in reality, the 
practices and culture of Silicon Valley are stagnant in key ways that further 
entrench the status quo. Further, Silicon Valley purports itself to be the ultimate 
meritocracy, but in reality, the culture reproduces and reinforces racial and 
gender inequities.7 In Silicon Valley, indeed, startup success tracks dominant 
cultural norms found in larger society. While the ideas, inventions, and 
companies purport to disrupt and innovate, the ecosystem of Silicon Valley 
values dominant race and class-based indicators of success and worthiness to the 
detriment of “nontraditional” and minority entrepreneurs. Examining the 
decade-long fraud of Theranos with a critical lens, the company’s story provides 
an example of the paradoxical values of Silicon Valley and their ultimate harm 
to companies, investors, and customers.8 The Theranos saga demonstrates the 
dysfunction and the systemic problems associated with the entrepreneurial 
process. This Article describes the pervasive structural racism and inequality in 
place that created an environment where a fraud of such magnitude was hidden 
for so long.  
Theranos, the former blood-testing technology company, is notable for its 
meteoric rise, emblematic of the culture of creating a Silicon Valley unicorn 
company, as well as its disastrous fall from grace.9 It is an unraveling that lost 
investors’ money and endangered the health of its clients. The company garnered 
attention because of its claims that its innovative and proprietary technology 
could perform over 200 medical tests with a single drop of blood, at low cost, 
thereby revolutionizing the medical industry.10 Given what is now known about 
the massive fraud and deception, the unbelievable ten-year growth and financial 
 
 7. Safiya Umoja Noble & Sarah T. Roberts, Technological Elites, the Meritocracy, and Postracial Myths 
in Silicon Valley, in RACISM POSTRACE 113 (Roopali Mukherjee, Sarah Banet-Weiser & Herman Gray eds., 
2019). 
 8. See Erin Griffith, Theranos and Silicon Valley’s ‘Fake It Till You Make It’ Culture, WIRED (Mar. 14, 
2018, 3:12 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/theranos-and-silicon-valleys-fake-it-till-you-make-it-culture 
(finding that in the so-called “age of unicorns,” startups can raise large sums of capital from private investors 
and become sizable businesses without the scrutiny, onerous disclosures, and strict regulatory compliance of 
being a public company). 
 9. “‘Unicorns’ are private companies with valuations of a billion dollars or more. As their name indicates, 
unicorns were originally so rare as to be almost mythical.” Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure 
and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 583 (2016). Theranos raised more than $700 million from 
venture capitalists and private investors, resulting in a $10 billion valuation at its peak in 2013–2014. See Roger 
Parloff, This CEO Is Out for Blood, FORTUNE (June 12, 2014, 4:37 AM), https://fortune.com/2014/06/ 
12/theranos-blood-holmes. 
 10. In fact, the two key pieces of the Theranos technology, the “Edison” and the “Minilab,” were found to 
be unreliable. Lisa Eitel, Theranos—And the Satisfaction of How Engineering Doesn’t Lie, DESIGN WORLD (Apr. 
23, 2019), https://www.designworldonline.com/schadenfreude-for-theranos-and-satisfaction-in-how-
engineering-doesnt-lie/. It was discovered that rather than using its own technology, the company often relied 
on the equipment of its competitor, Siemens, to perform certain blood tests. See id. Further, Theranos offered 
lower prices than its competition not because of the low cost of its product, but because the company was burning 
up cash raised from venture capitalists. See Zaw Thiha Tun, Theranos: A Fallen Unicorn, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/020116/theranos-fallen-unicorn.asp (Aug. 27, 2019). 
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success of Theranos is worthy of a close examination. The story of Theranos’ 
rise demonstrates how structural, economic, and social forces play out in the 
startup context to favor certain actors and reward certain behaviors, to the 
detriment of others. In this Article, I suggest that such examination reveals the 
structural bias and inequality that is woven into the current system of private 
capital raising for startup entities. The broader impact of the revelation is that 
seemingly more than any other factors, race, class, and education are strong 
indicators of startup success. The story of Theranos, its founder Elizabeth 
Holmes, its former company president Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani, and the 
company’s path to startup success reveals inequity rampant in the traditional 
canons of how to achieve entrepreneurial success. 
Elizabeth Holmes launched the blood-testing startup in Silicon Valley in 
2003 at the age of nineteen.11 Beyond Theranos’ claims and mission, much was 
made of Holmes as the young, “genius” founder of Theranos.12 This “rising star” 
and “young genius” narrative is central to American legend making in business 
and entrepreneurship.13 Historically, individual success and glory is celebrated 
and canonized. 14  For example, many historical figures, often referred to as 
robber barons, became wealthy through individual entrepreneurship efforts.15  
Holmes made for a compelling founder. She was described as magnetic 
with an inspiring, idealistic vision for her company.16 She is white and from an 
affluent family. She was well-educated; she went to a well-known prep school 
in Houston, Texas, 17  and after graduating, she matriculated to Stanford 
University in 2002. 18  She dropped out of Stanford during the fall of her 
sophomore year and used an education trust set up by her parents to start her 
 
 11. Lydia Ramsey Pflanzer, The Rise and Fall of Theranos, the Blood-Testing Startup That Went from 
Silicon Valley Darling to Facing Fraud Charges, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 11, 2019, 8:55 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-history-of-silicon-valley-unicorn-theranos-and-ceo-elizabeth-holmes-
2018-5. 
 12. Avery Hartmans & Paige Leskin, The Rise and Fall of Elizabeth Holmes, the Theranos Founder Whose 
Federal Fraud Trial Is Delayed Until 2021, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 11, 2020, 11:14 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/theranos-founder-ceo-elizabeth-holmes-life-story-bio-2018-4 (stating that 
Holmes was hailed “as a genius who styled herself as a female Steve Jobs”). 
 13. See generally Yiren Lu, Silicon Valley’s Youth Problem, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 12, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/magazine/silicon-valleys-youth-problem.html (articulating the concern 
about tech being “increasingly youth-fetishizing”). 
 14. See Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/google-employee-walkout-labor.html (“For decades, 
Silicon Valley has been ground zero for a vaguely utopian form of individualism—the idea that a single engineer 
with a laptop and an internet connection could change the world, or at least a long-established industry.”). 
 15. See Gus Lubin, Michael B. Kelley & Rob Wile, Meet the 24 Robber Barons Who Once Ruled America, 
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:56 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/americas-robber-barons-2012-3. 
 16. JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP 7, 151 (2018). 
 17. Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, Theranos Founder Faces a Test of Technology, and Reputation, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/business/theranos-founder-faces-a-test-of-
technology-and-reputation.html. 
 18. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 12. 
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company.19 At that time, the company was called Real Time Cures and it was 
based on her idea to develop a wearable patch that could adjust the dosage of 
drug delivery and notify doctors of variables in patients’ blood.20 She began 
developing lab-on-a-chip technology for blood tests, changed the company 
name to Theranos, a combination of the words “therapy” and “diagnosis,” and 
pursued a new strategy for the company that would make testing cheaper, more 
convenient, and accessible to consumers.21 Although she was heavily engaged 
with chemical engineering classes while on campus at Stanford, she had no 
medical or otherwise relevant scientific training. 22  Despite her lack of 
experience, she was at the helm of a company that would go on to raise hundreds 
of millions of dollars in private capital. Her rapid ascent is a racial reality 
unheard of for entrepreneurs of color because entrepreneurs of color are not only 
questioned with more rigor, but they typically have to demonstrate expertise and 
a viable product in order to access capital, and they also are unlikely to have 
trust funds to back them.23 
Up until Holmes and her company were exposed as fraudulent in 2015, she 
had clearly mastered fundraising in Silicon Valley. Successful and famous 
venture capitalists, such as Tim Draper and Steve Jurvetson, founders of famed 
venture capital firm, Draper Fisher Jurvetson, were early investors in 
Theranos.24 Famed power brokers, such as the former Chairman of Oracle, Don 
Lucas, and a former Secretary of State, George Shultz, were investors and served 
on the Board.25 The endorsement of these notable kingmakers within Silicon 
Valley’s ecosystem ensured that Holmes and Theranos gained the necessary 
visibility and buzz essential for unicorn status.  
As she built Theranos, and started to achieve success with investors, 
Elizabeth Holmes was featured on the cover of multiple tech and industry 
magazines.26  The media described her as a bright young star in the male-
 
 19. Caitlin Roper, This Woman Invented a Way to Run 30 Lab Tests on Only One Drop of Blood, WIRED 
(Feb. 18, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/02/elizabeth-holmes-theranos/. 
 20. Megan Liscomb, Elizabeth Holmes: The Making of a Scam, FINANCE 101, 
https://www.finance101.com/elizabeth-holmes/ (Nov. 10, 2020). 
 21. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 15.  
 22. Her chemical engineering professor, Channing Robertson, was a paid advisor to Theranos until 2012 
when he gave up a tenured position and an endowed chair in Stanford’s engineering department to join Theranos 
as an employee. See Tom Relihan, 4 Red Flags That Signaled Theranos’ Downfall, MIT SLOAN: IDEAS MADE 
TO MATTER (Oct. 29, 2018), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/4-red-flags-signaled-theranos-
downfall.  
 23. See Bärí A. Williams, I Can’t Wait for There to Be a Black Elizabeth Holmes, FAST CO. (Mar. 16, 
2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40545503/i-cant-wait-for-there-to-be-a-black-elizabeth-holmes; see also 
James Norman, A VC’s Guide to Investing in Black Founders, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 19, 2020), 
https://hbr.org/2020/06/a-vcs-guide-to-investing-in-black-founders. 
 24. The Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley (HBO documentary broadcast Mar. 18, 2019). 
 25. Roger Parloff, A Singular Board at Theranos, FORTUNE (June 12, 2014, 4:40 AM), 
http://fortune.com/2014/06/12/theranos-board-directors. 
 26. Katie Thomas & Reed Abelson, Elizabeth Holmes, Theranos C.E.O. and Silicon Valley Star, Accused 
of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/health/theranos-elizabeth-holmes-
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dominated tech industry and some described her as “the next Steve Jobs.”27 A 
professor of Holmes, Channing Robertson from Stanford’s engineering 
department, described Holmes as “a once-in-a-generation genius,” comparing 
her to Newton, Einstein, Mozart, and Leonardo da Vinci.28 Forbes Magazine 
referred to her as “the youngest self-made woman billionaire.” 29  President 
Obama appointed her to be a U.S. ambassador for global entrepreneurship, and 
Harvard Medical School invited her to join their Board of Fellows. 30  The 
extensive media attention helped propel her fundraising.31  
Inevitably, the fictions of Theranos unraveled as former employees blew 
the whistle and told their story to John Carreyrou, an investigative reporter for 
the Wall Street Journal. Carreyrou wrote about the myriad of lies and 
discrepancies at Theranos’ lab, resulting in regulatory, civil, and criminal actions 
against Holmes and Balwani.32 In 2016, Theranos was sanctioned by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 33  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) accused the company, its founder and CEO, and its former 
president of engaging in an elaborate fraud, alleging that Theranos, Holmes, and 
Balwani had made false statements about the company’s technology, business, 
and financial performance.34 Theranos and Holmes settled the SEC charge for 
an amount of $500,000 in addition to other penalties.35 As of the writing of this 
Article, the charges against Balwani have not been settled. In September 2018, 
 
fraud.html (“[Holmes] became an overnight celebrity, featured on magazine covers and richest-woman lists and 
in glowing articles.”). 
 27. Parloff, supra note 9 (providing a statement from Holmes’ former professor Channing Roberts) (“I 
realized that I could have just as well been looking into the eyes of a Steve Jobs or a Bill Gates . . . .”). 
 28. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 211. 
 29. In 2015, at the age of thirty, Holmes debuted on the Forbes 400 List. See #435 Elizabeth Holmes, 
FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/elizabeth-holmes/?sh=7b447be647a7 (last visited May 21, 2021). 
 30. Sarah Buhr, Elizabeth Holmes Quietly Stepped Down from Obama’s Business Ambassador Program, 
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 2, 2016, 4:38 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/02/elizabeth-holmes-quietly-stepped-
down-from-obamas-business-ambassador-program; Steve Tobak, After the Theranos Mess, Can We Finally Quit 
Idolizing Entrepreneurs?, Fortune (May 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2016/05/27/quit-idolizing-
entrepreneurs/. 
 31. Press Release, SEC, Theranos, CEO Holmes, and Former President Balwani Charged with Massive 
Fraud (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-41 (“The complaints allege that Theranos, 
Holmes, and Balwani made numerous false and misleading statements in investor presentations, product 
demonstrations, and media articles by which they deceived investors into believing that its key product—a 
portable blood analyzer—could conduct comprehensive blood tests from finger drops of blood, revolutionizing 
the blood testing industry.”). 
 32. In 2015, the Wall Street Journal published an investigative story raising doubts about the company’s 
blood-testing technology and the veracity of its financial performance. See John Carreyrou, How Startup 
Theranos Has Struggled with Its Blood-Test Technology, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:20 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggled-with-blood-tests-1444881901. 
 33. John Carreyrou, Michael Siconolfi & Christopher Weaver, Theranos Dealt Sharp Blow as Elizabeth 
Holmes Is Banned from Operating Labs, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-
regulator-bans-theranos-ceo-elizabeth-holmes-from-operating-labs-for-two-years-1467956064. 
 34. Press Release, supra note 31. The SEC referred to Theranos as an “elaborate, years-long fraud” in 
which Holmes and Balwani “exaggerated or made false statements about the company’s technology, business, 
and financial performance.” Id. 
 35. Id. 
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after defaulting on a $65 million loan, Theranos shut down operations.36 On June 
15, 2018, Holmes and Balwani were indicted in federal court in the Northern 
District of California for wire fraud and conspiracy.37 Holmes and Balwani are 
awaiting trial on these wire fraud and conspiracy charges. 
In the end, Theranos turned out to be a mule rather than a mythical unicorn. 
In the wake of the company’s downfall and that of its founder, there are many 
questions that remain, not the least of which is the question of how Holmes was 
able to achieve the level of financial success that Theranos rested upon, without 
the requisite due diligence and oversight from investors and regulators. Putting 
aside the question of Elizabeth Holmes’ intent to defraud investors and her 
Board, the story of Elizabeth Holmes’ rise and her route to success illustrates the 
inequities inherent in the culture of the startup world. The story of Theranos, 
“[a]t its root, [is] a parable that cuts to the central dysfunctions in the American 
economic and political order, one that should dismantle our notions of 
meritocracy and put a strict limit on our forbearance for elites.”38 
The central premise of this Article is that the culture of creating a model 
unicorn company in Silicon Valley seems to adhere and perpetuate the principle 
that white, connected, and pedigreed founders are given primacy over others. 
Elizabeth Holmes’ story is firmly rooted in, and is illustrative of, this culture. 
She was able to raise astounding amounts of money from private investors, not 
just because she had a great idea, but arguably because she was white, connected, 
and had the right pedigree, consistent with the culture surrounding a unicorn 
company. 39 Her story is not just a story of personal charisma or bias—it’s a story 
of the structures of entrepreneurship in America.  
This Article reveals the ways in which aspects of Theranos reflects the 
larger structural problems within Silicon Valley, analyzing the structural 
underpinnings that perpetuate the closed market, patronage system that largely 
benefits white male entrepreneurs in particular. The two largest facets of this 
system are a startup culture that rewards only a certain narrow category of 
founders deemed “worthy” by the culture’s standards and restricted private 
 
 36. John Carreyrou, Blood-Testing Firm Theranos to Dissolve, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2018, 12:10 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/blood-testing-firm-theranos-to-dissolve-1536115130 (reporting that, on 
September 4, 2018, Theranos announced in an email to investors that it would cease operations and release its 
assets and remaining cash to creditors after all efforts to find a buyer came to nothing). At the time of the writing 
of this Article, Holmes is awaiting trial on the wire fraud and conspiracy charges; however, the trial has been 
delayed due to Holmes’ recent pregnancy announcement. Yasmin Khorram, Elizabeth Holmes Trial Pushed to 
August Following Surprise Pregancy Announcement, CNBC (Mar. 17, 2021, 2:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2021/03/17/elizabeth-holmes-trial-pushed-to-august-after-surprise-pregnancy-announcement.html. 
 37. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Elizabeth Holmes Indicted on Wire Fraud Charges, Steps Down from Theranos, 
CNN: BUS. (June 16, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/15/technology/elizabeth-holmes-
indicted-theranos/index.html. 
 38. Avi Asher-Schapiro, What the Theranos Documentary Misses, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/153419/theranos-documentary-misses. 
 39. See Sarah McBride, Insight: In Silicon Valley Start-Up World, Pedigree Counts, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 
2013, 2:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-%20%20%20startup-connections-insight-
idUSBRE98B15U20130912. 
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markets used by the elites to entrench their cultural norms. It is a culture that 
does not necessarily reward based on merit. There is a philosophy of worth, 
reflected in the cultural norms, and the private markets create a mechanism for 
enforcing the cultural mindset.  
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I looks at the culture in the startup 
ecosystem that dictates the process of becoming a unicorn company. It describes 
the general problems that exist within startup culture and the way the problems 
manifested in the context of Theranos. Part I also unearths the ways in which 
race and other cultural norms play a role in entrepreneurial success. Part I notes 
dramatic racial, gender, and class differences across venture capital funding, 
innovation levels, profitability, and the economy as a whole. Part II describes 
the traditional private fundraising mechanisms for entrepreneurs and investors, 
building on Part I to discuss perverse market incentives that perpetuate racism 
and classism within the context of the private markets. Additionally, Part II 
demonstrates the ways the private markets effectively enforce and perpetuate the 
closed homogenous culture in Silicon Valley in which entrepreneurs are required 
to raise money. While a detailed discussion of any policy proposals for changing 
the private financial markets is outside the scope of this Article, Part III offers 
some considerations toward challenging and changing institutional bias in 
Silicon Valley. While this Article focuses on Silicon Valley, the approaches and 
practices in the region among the entrepreneurial community have implications 
for entrepreneurial ecosystems nationally, and increasingly, internationally. 
I.  CHASING UNICORNS: STARTUP CULTURE AND THE HEURISTICS THAT 
ENABLE IT  
Within limits, Silicon Valley places a primacy on disruption and 
innovation.40 Generally, new ventures seeking to be a disruptive company or a 
company that innovates and changes existing ways of doing business are 
lauded.41 While those in the space admire some level of disruption, in many 
 
 40. See DAVID EISWERT, EMILY SCUDDER & JOEL GRANT, T. ROWE PRICE INSIGHTS, TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION AND DISRUPTION 1 (2019), https://www.troweprice.com/content/dam/fai/Collections/ 
MarketScene/tech_innovation_disruption/Tech_Innovation_Disruption_Insight.pdf; see Maximilian Schroeck 
& Gopal Srinivasan, How to Innovate the Silicon Valley Way, DELOITTE: INSIGHTS (July 22, 2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/innovation/tapping-into-silicon-valley-culture-of-
innovation.html (“Silicon Valley has been driving innovation and disruption for several decades, and through 
the beginning of the 21st century, it continues to be one of the world’s most important centers of innovation and 
technology disruption. The region is notable for its combination of widely available capital and rapid scale-up 
of commercially viable intellectual property (IP). More than one-third of the 141 companies in the Americas, 
Europe, and Asia Pacific that grew to a valuation of greater than $1 billion between 2010 and 2015 were located 
in the Bay Area, a striking testament to the area’s ability to accelerate commercial success. Perhaps for this 
reason, 61 percent of companies with innovation centers have a presence in Silicon Valley.” (citation omitted) 
(footnote omitted)). 
 41. See Barry Ritzholz, The World Is About to Undergo Even Faster Change, INDUSTRYWEEK (July 6, 
2017), https://www.industryweek.com/technology/world-about-undergo-even-faster-change; Clayton M. 
Christensen, Michael E. Raynor & Rory McDonald, What Is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 
2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-innovation (“Many leaders of small, entrepreneurial 
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ways though, participants in the space are consistent in entrenching power and 
influence so that even innovative unicorn companies disrupting industries 
effectively reinforce the existing power structure and traditional influences of 
institutions and those of a certain pedigree.  
High-growth companies looking to achieve unicorn status often seek to 
develop the latest innovation or game-changing product in order to disrupt the 
industry status quo. Some of the most famous unicorns, for example, Uber, 
GrubHub, and AirBnB, capitalized on smartphones and cloud-based software to 
disrupt taxi, food, and hotel industries by making them mobile.42  
The ride-sharing company Uber Technologies, Inc. is a poster child for 
Silicon’s Valley endless quest for innovation.43 Uber has been so prominent in 
the startup economy that the drastic changes in industries as a result of it have 
been referred to as “uberisation.”44 Uber is a company that revolutionized the 
taxi industry, promoting environmentally friendly ride-sharing and ostensibly 
creating new jobs along the way.45 Since its official launch in 2011 and until its 
initial public offering in 2019, critics of the company have argued that constantly 
pushing for growth, innovation, and profit led the company to mistakes and 
deviations from its original mission.46 Uber has been criticized for its unfair 
treatment of drivers, for disrupting the taxicab business, for increasing traffic 
congestion, and for fostering a toxic workplace culture where retaliation and 
sexual harassment festered. 47  The company has also been criticized for its 
aggressive strategy in dealing with taxi regulators and for other potentially 
unlawful practices.48 The company most recently came under fire for neglecting 
and exploiting its drivers, since Uber maintains and lobbies for the position that 
its drivers are independent contractors and therefore not eligible for the 
protections that an employer-employee relationship provides.49 Further, Uber 
 
companies praise [disruptive innovation] as their guiding star; so do many executives at large, well-established 
organizations, including Intel, Southern New Hampshire University, and Salesforce.com.”). 
 42. KC Karnes, 5 Disruptive Apps and How They Changed Their Industries, CLEVERTAP (Nov. 5, 2019), 
https://clevertap.com/blog/disruptive-apps/; see also David Touve & Gosia Glinska, Fact or Fiction? Debunking 
the Founder Myth, UVA DARDEN: IDEAS TO ACTION (Sept. 12, 2019), https://ideas.darden.virginia.edu/fact-or-
fiction. 
 43. Fan, supra note 9, at 633 (“Uber is the poster child for unicorns.”). 
 44. Simon Jack, Now What Next for Uberisation?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/business-41359327 (“Uberisation has come to mean the turning of traditional service industries on their 
head, by providing a technological platform to match users and providers on a massive scale.”). 
 45. Martin Luenendonk, 7 Strategies Uber Is Using to Disrupt the Taxi Industry, CLEVERISM (Feb. 16, 
2018), https://www.cleverism.com/strategies-uber-is-using-to-disrupt-the-taxi-industry/; see About Us, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/us/en/about/ (last visited May 21, 2021). 
 46. See Farhad Manjoo, Opinion, The Uber I.P.O. Is a Moral Stain on Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/opinion/uber-ipo.html. 
 47. See id.  
 48. Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays with Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-to-the-precipice.html?module=inline. 
 49. See Michael Hiltzik, Column: With Prop. 22, Uber and Lyft Used Their Wealth to Reshape Labor Law 
in Their Sole Interest, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-11-
04/uber-lyft-proposition-22. 
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drivers are not paid a living wage.50 Arguably, its environmental arguments have 
not yet been made clear; while certainly ride-sharing has increased and may have 
encouraged some to forego a vehicle, vehicle ownership has increased in cities 
where Uber and Uber’s competitor, Lyft, are popular.51 Research shows that 
ride-hailing growth has led to more traffic and less transit use in major American 
cities—not the reverse that was hoped for.52  
Uber and Lyft combined forces on lobbying efforts for an exemption from 
California’s A.B. 5 law. An exemption would allow the rise share companies to 
continue to treat their drivers as employees rather than independent contractors. 
Their lobbying efforts led to the most expensive campaign in California 
history. 53  In November 2020, California voters passed Proposition 22, 
exempting drivers and other gig economy workers from A.B. 5 and classifying 
them as independent contractors.54 On the one hand, Uber and Lyft are lauded 
as innovating companies who have disrupted an entire industry, but on the other 
hand, they spent record amounts of money to lobby to maintain social and racial 
inequities, lobbying against a law that would have offered drivers minimum 
wage, overtime pay, workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and paid 
sick leave.55 Yet, because of Uber’s success, founders of other startups seeking 
to replicate its success and investors backing those founders look to Uber as the 
“blueprint.” 
A. HOMOGENEITY AND THE EFFECT OF LACK OF DIVERSITY  
 The startup world—its investors and entrepreneurs—is a mostly 
homogenous, white and male community.56 Intentions aside, the startup space 
 
 50. See Shannon Bond, Uber and Lyft to Continue Treating Drivers as Independent Contractors, NPR 
(Nov. 4, 2020, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/04/931435959/uber-and-lyft-to-continue-treating-
drivers-as-independent-contractors. 
 51. See BRUCE SCHALLER, SCHALLER CONSULTING, THE NEW AUTOMOBILITY: LYFT, UBER AND THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICAN CITIES 2 (2018), http://www.schallerconsult.com/rideservices/automobility.pdf (“TNCs 
[transportation network companies] added billions of miles of driving in the nation’s largest metro areas at the 
same time that car ownership grew more rapidly than the population.”). 
 52. Id. (“Shared ride services . . . while touted as reducing traffic, in fact add mileage to city streets. They 
do not offset the traffic-clogging impacts of private ride TNC services like UberX and Lyft.”). 
 53. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Prop 22 Passes in California, Exempting Uber and Lyft from Classifying Drivers 
as Employees, CNN (Nov. 4, 2020, 4:02 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/04/tech/california-proposition-
22/index.html. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Uber exemplifies the innovation paradox in Silicon Valley. It is a company that literally transformed 
an entire industry, reshaping transportation across the globe, and also sparked the transformation of many other 
industries as startups inspired by Uber created on-demand services in other spaces. Yet despite all of its 
innovation, the technology company has been plagued by sexist and toxic culture in the workplace and took an 
approach to paying its labor force that many would argue entrenches the status quo. See supra notes 47, 49–50 
and accompanying text. 
 56. See Kim-Mai Cutler, Here’s a Detailed Breakdown of Racial and Gender Diversity Data Across U.S. 
Venture Capital Firms, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 6, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/06/s23p-racial-
gender-diversity-venture/?guccounter=1. 
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has been dominated by middle and upper-class white males.57  This issue is 
distinct from the pattern matching and implicit bias described below. The 
distinct point made by this Subpart is that those involved in the startup 
ecosystem are likely white and male. According to one analysis, 77.1% of 
venture-backed founders are white and 90.8% of them are men.58 More white 
men than white women and more white men than men of color are involved in 
entrepreneurship.59 As with entrepreneurs of color, women founders face an 
uphill battle when convincing investors of the value of their products and their 
ideas.60 Race and gender play a role in entrepreneurship, but increasingly class 
is proving a factor as well.61 Just under half of venture capitalists attended either 
Harvard or Stanford.62 “The homogeneity is geographic, too: more than 90% of 
venture capitalists surveyed lived on the East or West coasts” according to the 
National Venture Capital Association. 63  Little data is known about the 
representation of angel investors or friends and family investors. In their report, 
Access to Capital for Entrepreneurs: Removing Barriers, the Kauffman 
Foundation looks at geographic barriers to accessing capital:  
 
 57. Mary Ann Azevedo, Untapped Opportunity: Minority Founders Still Being Overlooked, CRUNCHBASE 
(Feb. 27, 2019), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/untapped-opportunity-minority-founders-still-being-
overlooked/. 
 58. RATEMYINVESTOR, DIVERSITY IN U.S. STARTUPS 7–8 (2018), https://ratemyinvestor.com/ 
DiversityVCReport_Final.pdf. 
 59. See id. at 1, 8–10. 
 60. Lynn Perkins, How to Secure VC Funding When You’re the Only Woman in the Room, ENTREPRENEUR: 
WOMEN (July 31, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/316019; see also Press Release, Morgan Stanley, 
Access to Capital Survey: Investors Perceive Funding Landscape as Balanced, Despite a Substantial Gap in 
Their Actual Investments in Female and Multicultural Entrepreneurs (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.morganstanley.com/press-releases/access-to-capital-survey--investors-perceive-funding-
landscape-a (“Nearly 40% of men say that investing in women-owned businesses is not a priority at all, 
compared to only 7% of female investors. Similarly, 31% of white investors say they do not prioritize investing 
in minority-owned businesses. Investors report being less likely to connect to the sectors that female and 
multicultural entrepreneurs serve. Nearly half of investors (47%) cite an entrepreneur’s sector as a compelling 
reason why they invest in businesses in general, but that number drops to 36% for women-owned businesses and 
33% for minority-owned businesses.”). Further, the survey finds that investors’ perception is that multicultural 
and women business owners get the right amount, or more, of capital they deserve to run and grow their 
businesses. The Trillion-Dollar Blind Spot, MORGAN STANLEY (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/trillion-dollar-blind-spot-infographic/. The reality is that investors report 
capitalizing multicultural and women-owned businesses at 80% less than businesses overall. Id. 
 61. “Data from 1996 to 2017 show that men are consistently more likely to start businesses each month 
than women, and 2017 was the first year in which the rate of black and white new entrepreneurs was the same.” 
VICTOR HWANG, SAMEEKSHA DESAI & ROSS BAIRD, KAUFFMAN FOUND., ACCESS TO CAPITAL FOR 
ENTREPRENEURS: REMOVING BARRIERS 1 (2019), https://www.kauffman.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ 
CapitalReport_042519.pdf. 
 62. Simone Stolzoff, Venture Capital’s Diversity Problem in Two Words: Alma Mater, QUARTZ (July 31, 
2018), https://qz.com/1343912/venture-capitals-diversity-problem-in-two-words-alma-mater/.  
 63. Elizabeth Scharpf, This Is Not a Typo: Only 3% of Americans Are Legally Allowed to Invest in Start-
Ups, Quartz (June 22, 2015), https://qz.com/431198/this-is-not-a-typo-only-3-of-americans-are-legally-
allowed-to-invest-in-start-ups/.  
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  Five metro areas—New York City, Miami, Los Angeles, Houston, and 
Dallas—were estimated to have contributed to 50 percent of net new firm 
creation between 2010 and 2014.  
  In addition, VC industry data reveals considerable geographic and 
industry concentration. Close to 80 percent of about $21.1 billion in VC 
funding in the first quarter of 2018 was disbursed in five regional clusters—
San Francisco (North Bay Area), Silicon Valley (South Bay Area), New 
England, New York City metro, and LA/Orange County—with slightly more 
than 44 percent in the North and South Bay Areas.64 
 While public companies face public scrutiny and advocacy around the 
composition of their board of directors, private companies face less scrutiny. 
Indeed, although there is less publicly available information on private board 
diversity data, there is a lack of gender and racial diversity on private company 
boards.65 
 A study of private board diversity data was produced by a collaboration 
between Crunchbase and Him for Her.66 In 2020, the researchers looked at the 
boards of the most heavily funded U.S.-based private venture-backed companies 
and found that 49% of companies did not have a woman on the board.67 “Women 
held 11 percent of board seats, up from 7 percent the previous year.” 68 
Executives and investors compose 75% of director seats, of which 8% are held 
by women.69 Their initial analysis of racial and ethnic revealed that “only 3 
percent of board seats were held by women of color, compared with an estimated 
18 percent held by men of color; and 81 percent of companies don’t have a 
woman of color on the board at all.”70 Nearly half of private company boards 
are all male.71 “The ratio of men to women in private-company boardrooms is 
roughly 9-to-1.”72 According to the researchers, at current rates, “it will take a 
decade for private company boards to achieve gender parity.”73 Most women 
directors are the only women on the board. “Among the roughly half of boards 
that include any women, 66 percent include just one woman.”74 Of the private 
company boards studied, only 18% included two or more women.75 “While 
research suggests that boards need at least three women to capture the full 
 
 64. HWANG ET AL., supra note 61, at 7 (footnote omitted). 
 65. See Jennifer S. Fan, Innovating Inclusion: The Impact of Women on Private Company Boards, 46 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 345, 345 (2019). 
 66.  Ann Shepherd & Gené Teare, 2020 Study of Gender Diversity on Private Company Boards, 
CRUNCHBASE (Mar. 1, 2021), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/2020-diversity-study-on-private-company-
boards/. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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economic benefits of diversity, only 6 percent of the companies studied met this 
criteria.”76 
 Among the country’s largest companies, a 2018 study of Fortune 500 
boards found 4.6% of directors were “minority women.”77 Fewer than one in 
five of the companies studied had a single woman of color in the boardroom.78 
According to the Crunchbase and Him for Her Report:  
   Directors on private-company boards can be classified in three groups: 
executive directors, investor directors and independent directors. CEOs, co-
founders and any members of the management team who hold board seats are 
considered executive directors, which make up 22 percent of the board seats 
within the companies studied.  
  As venture-backed companies raise outside funding, investors often take 
seats on the board. Within the study data, investor directors make up the 
largest pool of board members for venture-backed companies, with 53 percent 
of seats.79 
The study found that “[b]oards can improve diversity by adding independent 
directors at an earlier stage and drawing from a diverse candidate pool sourced 
beyond the personal networks of sitting directors.”80 
 Research on homogenous groups shows that the more a person looks like 
ourselves, the more we are willing to trust them.81 We put too much trust in the 
judgment of people who look similar to us. Homogenous groups feel more 
comfortable and don’t generate enough skepticism. 82  Diverse groups, in 
contrast, are more likely to ask tough questions and uncover important facts. 
Diversity increases innovation and leads to increased profits. 83 
 Inequity is likely to occur when there is such pervasive homogeneity.84 The 
prevalence of homogeneity in Silicon Valley exacerbates the problem of implicit 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. DELOITTE, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE 2018 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND 
MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 17 fig.6 (2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/center-for-board-
effectiveness/articles/missing-pieces-fortune-500-board-diversity-study-2018.html (click “Download the PDF” 
to download). 
 78. Shepherd & Teare, supra note 66. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Steve Kelman, Group Diversity and the Accuracy of Group Judgments, FWC: THE LECTERN (Dec. 14, 
2015, 12:29 PM), https://fcw.com/blogs/lectern/2015/12/kelman-group-diversity.aspx; Harry Farmer, Ryan 
McKay & Manos Tsakiris, Trust in Me: Trustworthy Others Are Seen as More Physically Similar to the Self, 25 
PSYCH. SCI. 290, 290–92 (2014) (“Coupled with research suggesting that people have overly positive self-views, 
including viewing themselves as more trustworthy than the average person, these findings suggest that people 
favor those who are physically similar to themselves. Indeed, facial similarity leads to increased attributions of 
trustworthiness and increased cooperation in both trust games and common-good games.” (citations omitted)). 
 82. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, TALKING TO STRANGERS (2019) (writing that our cognitive biases tend 
toward believing what others say is the truth with little natural skepticism). 
 83. See Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter, SCI. AM. (Oct. 1, 2014), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/; Fan, supra note 65. 
 84. See generally BUCK GEE & DENISE PECK, ASCEND FOUND., THE ILLUSION OF ASIAN SUCCESS: SCANT 
PROGRESS FOR MINORITIES IN CRACKING THE GLASS CEILING FROM 2007–2015 (2017), https://cdn.ymaws.com/ 
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bias and pattern matching that is described below. The next Subpart discusses 
how the culture of fundraising, pattern matching and implicit bias play a role in 
the chase for the next unicorn.  
B. FUNDRAISING AND PATTERN MATCHING 
 The pursuit of unicorn status is comparable to the California gold rush and 
exemplifies a culture of pursuing growth at all costs.85 The mentality of trying 
to get a piece of that gold, metaphorically speaking, is what drives the culture.86 
In order to grow fast, entrepreneurs rely on private capital to finance their goals. 
Capital raising, and the private market that supports it, is big business and 
probably the number one driver of startup culture.87 For a high-growth startup 
venture, most founders are in a constant cycle of fundraising and prototyping for 
the product or service offered by their company. Founders typically start their 
company using their own funds, in a practice that is known as “bootstrapping.”88 
Once they have used the available funds and resources available to them, they 
may turn to their friends and family to raise additional capital.89 Where available 
to them, founders may often ask their parents to take out a second mortgage on 
their home or the founder may mortgage her own home. 90 It will be discussed 
in more detail below, but it is worth noting here how history, racism, and the 
racial wealth gap affect who typically can bootstrap and can access these initial 
financial resources. 91  Many entrepreneurs of color cannot tap into any 
 
www.ascendleadership.org/resource/resmgr/research/theillusionofasiansuccess.pdf (pointing to distinctive 
diversity challenges for each racial and gender cohort in Bay Area technology companies and showing that the 
racial gap is worsening). 
 85. The California gold rush occurred during the middle of the nineteenth century and led directly to the 
settlement of California. Mike McPhate, How the California Gold Rush Echoes in Silicon Valley, MEDIUM: 
CALIF. SUN (Jan. 23, 2018), https://medium.californiasun.co/gold-rush-34072fd9d467. 
 86. See id. (highlighting the Californian tolerance for failure in capitalist enterprise, which the author 
asserts stems from California’s encounter with gold-mining). 
 87. See generally NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF 
VENTURE CAPITAL-BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 9 (5th ed. 2009), 
http://faculty.msmc.edu/hossain/grad_bank_and_money_policy/economic%20importance%20of%20venture%
20capital%20backed%20companies.pdf. 
 88. R.L. Adams, 8 Bulletproof Ways to Bootstrap Your Business, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/305600 (defining bootstrapping in business as “self-funding through pre-
existing cash flow and being critical of outgoing expenses”). 
 89. See Alejandro Cremades, How Funding Rounds Work for Startups, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2018, 5:14 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alejandrocremades/2018/12/26/how-funding-rounds-work-for-startups/ 
#13bcd33b7386; The Ins and Outs of Raising Money from Friends and Family, ENTREPRENEUR, 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/228103 (last visited May 21, 2021). 
 90. See Gene Marks, Entrepreneurs Are Great, But It’s Mom and Dad Who Gave Them Their Start, 
GUARDIAN (Jan 31, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/jan/31/small-business-
entrepreneurs-success-parents; Should Parents Fund a Child’s Startup Company?, TARANTINO L. FIRM, LLP 
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.tarantinolaw.com/blog/2019/12/should-parents-fund-a-childs-startup-company/; 
Krista Tuomi, Mortgage Financing: Dangerous Headwinds for Startups, VC LIST (May 1, 2020), https://vc-
list.com/mortgage-financing-startups/. 
 91. Keenan Beasley, For Black Entrepreneurs, the Racial Wealth Gap Makes Finding Funding Nearly 
Impossible, FAST CO. (July 23, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90531094/for-black-entrepreneurs-the-
racial-wealth-gap-makes-finding-funding-nearly-impossible (“[A] historical product of the racial wealth gap—
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meaningful resources to bootstrap their venture. After founders have exhausted 
the resources of their friends and family, founders might then turn to angel 
investors or venture capital investors for additional capital.92 For high-growth 
companies, venture capital investment can prove instrumental for startup 
success since venture capital-backed companies are more likely to succeed than 
non-venture backed firms.93 
 For each round of funding, the valuation of the company becomes 
increasingly important as the valuation reflects the value of the investor’s 
investment. 94  Valuation is a driver towards investment because a higher 
valuation increases the value of the investor’s investment. It should be noted that 
high valuation does not necessarily correlate to a strong business model nor does 
it speak to the venture’s profitability. Although a company may have hit a 
billion-dollar valuation on the private market, some unicorn companies may not 
have a working business model; the company may or may not even be profitable, 
yet investors believing in a company’s mission, its potential, or its founder may 
clamor to invest and, in turn, push up the valuation.95 In fact, many unicorn 
companies are often not profitable.96 Several unicorn companies that captured 
our collective imagination we now know did not have a clear plan for 
profitability, such as Uber, Palantir, and Zenefits,97 for example. The influx of 
capital and funding propelled these companies to success, not because they were 
the most efficient or capable company, demonstrating that investors are not 
 
the inherent disparity in median wealth between people of different races—most Black entrepreneurs do not 
have access to a network that can provide them with a type of investment known as a “Friends and Family” 
round.”). 
 92. See Cremades, supra note 89 (explaining that the pre-seed round is often the “friends and family” 
round, and more angel investors come in during the seed round). 
 93. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1411 
(2008). 
 94. See Nathan Reiff, Series A, B, C, Funding: How It Works, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/102015/series-b-c-funding-what-it-all-means-and-
how-it-works.asp (Mar. 5, 2020). 
 95. According to Pitchbook, “[s]ixty-four percent of the 100+ companies valued at more than $1 billion to 
complete a VC-backed IPO since 2010 were unprofitable, and in 2018, money-losing startups actually fared 
better on the stock exchange than money-earning businesses.” Kate Clark, Unicorns Aren’t Profitable, and Wall 
Street Doesn’t Care, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 26, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/26/unicorns-
arent-profitable-wall-street-doesnt-care; CAMERON STANFILL & JORDAN BECK, PITCHBOOK, SEARCHING FOR 
VALIDATION: AN ANALYSIS OF VALUATION PERFORMANCE FOR $1 BILLION+ VC-BACKED EXITS 10–11 (2019), 
https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/PitchBook_1Q_2019_Analyst_Note_Searching_for_Validation.p
df. 
 96. See Jeffery Lee Funk, Only 6 of 73 Unicorn Startups Are Profitable, and None Did Recent IPOs, 
MEDIUM (Nov. 23, 2020), https://jeffreyleefunk.medium.com/only-6-of-73-unicorn-startups-are-profitable-and-
none-did-recent-ipos-287d5c7ac8d0 (“In summary, only 6 of 73 Unicorns had profits in 2019 (and 2020) and 
most of the profitable Unicorns did IPOs many years ago. This suggests that privately-held Unicorns, ones that 
have yet to do IPOs, are likely unprofitable.”); Clark, supra note 95. 
 97. Zenefits is a company that created human resource software and paid millions of dollars in fines to 
California regulators and the SEC because its employees sold insurance without proper licenses. See Heather 
Somerville, Zenefits and Co-founder Parker Conrad to Pay SEC Fine of Nearly $1 Million, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 
2017, 4:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zenefits-sec/zenefits-and-co-founder-parker-conrad-to-
pay-sec-fine-of-nearly-1-million-idUSKBN1CV3NS. 
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necessarily looking for profitability, but the next opportunity for the most return 
on investment.98  
Fundraising for a new entrepreneurial venture is challenging in that the 
founder has to balance the everyday demands of starting a venture and at the 
same time seek cash to maintain that venture. Silicon Valley is flush with 
ambitious, unicorn-seeking founders who meet that challenge by massaging the 
truth to lure investors and investors who may accept incomplete information in 
the name of innovation.99 In the early days in the life of a startup, the founder 
can likely be found creating her company’s product or services. In addition to 
moving the company from a big idea to a tangible product or service, the founder 
is also likely to be in the process of fundraising to finance the big idea. It is often 
common for founders to start fundraising even before the product or service has 
launched.100 This dual track of fundraising on the basis of a big idea while 
creating a tangible manifestation of the big idea has profound implications for 
Black and other non-traditional entrepreneurs. One of those implications is that, 
in reality, founders of color are typically required to have a viable product before 
fundraising. Adding to that is that investors, who are largely white, are not likely 
to take notice of founders of color. This failure could be explained by several 
factors that include pattern matching and implicit bias, but also cultural factors, 
reflecting a difference in cultural problems, solutions, surroundings, and 
resources.101 There is an inherent tension in capital raising as entrepreneurs seek 
to quickly enter the market and scale their enterprises, while innovating and 
defining a product or service at the same time.  
Fundraising culture is built around obfuscation of facts or the use of what 
has been coined “vaporware.”102 This opaqueness is relatively common among 
 
 98. Clark, supra note 95; see J.B. Maverick, Is Profitability or Growth More Important for a Business?, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/020415/what-more-important-business-
profitability-or-growth.asp (Jan. 30, 2020) (“Profitability and growth go hand-in-hand when it comes to success 
in business. Profit is key to basic financial survival as a corporate entity, while growth is key to profit and long-
term success. Investors should weigh each factor as it relates to a particular company.”). 
 99. See generally Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Keynote Address at the SEC-Rock Center on Corporate 
Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-
valley-initiative-3-31-16.html (“Nearly all venture valuations are highly subjective. . . . We continue to see 
instances of public companies and their senior executives manipulating their accounting to meet various 
expectations and projections.”). 
 100. See Kate Endress, How to Do Seed Fundraising Right, VENTUREBEAT (Sept. 2, 2012, 8:30 AM), 
https://venturebeat.com/2012/09/02/how-to-do-fundraising-right-on-a-seed-round/. 
 101. Norman, supra note 23. 
 102. The term “vaporware” was coined in the 1980s when software companies would hype their product to 
obtain funding often obscuring the reality of the company’s progress. See Robert A. Prentice & John H. 
Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of High-Tech Companies, 8 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–3 (1994). When applied in the context of the startup world, it is a term used to describe 
marketing strategy to promote a brand, product, or founder in the pre-money or pre-seed stage, typically meaning 
that the promotion is “little more than hot air.” Joel KO, Opinion: Why Startups Need More Vaporware and the 
‘Elon Musk Effect’ to Innovate, TECHINASIA (May 26, 2017), https://www.techinasia.com/talk/time-more-
vaporware. 
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founders and is often accepted by and even encouraged by investors.103 The idea 
is that founders create aspirational forecasts and optimistic projections to present 
to investors and potential investors. Founders are hoping that their mild 
deception will be overlooked and forgiven once they have made their investors’ 
money back at a high return.104 In turn, investors are hoping to make money at 
often outsized rates of return. It is therefore not uncommon for investors to 
believe in a white founder and invest in a product or services with little evidence 
of success or promises of future success.105 On the other hand, founders of color 
are expected to provide a minimal viable product before pitching to investors.106 
This environment creates a scenario where the investor is not always in 
complete possession of the facts related to their investment. Because there is 
little or no track record and often no product, investors might make investment 
decisions based on instinct or their gut. The effect of relying on one’s gut is that 
investors may revert to heuristics or rely upon mental short-cuts to make 
investment decisions, meaning that investors default to pattern matching in how 
they determine which founder or startup to invest in. Valuing innovation and 
disruption means that funding and support happens at an unduly early stage, 
resulting in the entire ecosystem relying on heuristics from the start.  
In the absence of concrete, tangible, and objective projections, forecasts, or 
products, the investor must make investment decisions based on their belief in 
the founder or on gut instinct.107 The import of this phenomenon is that often 
investment decisionmaking is tied to implicit bias108 and pattern matching, 109 
 
 103. Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a Post-
Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1174 (1996) (discussing the utility of vaporware announcements). 
 104. Most investors seek no less than 20% to 40% return on their investment. See What Is Your Potential 
‘Return on Investment’ for an Angel Investor?, VENTURE GIANTS (May 22, 2020), 
https://www.venturegiants.com/what-is-your-potential-return-on-investment-for-an-angel-investor (“Most 
experienced Angel Investors will expect no less than 31–40% annual returns on their early stage and start up 
angel investments.”); see also Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.–Dec. 1998), 
https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works (“In return for financing one to two years of a company’s start-
up, venture capitalists expect a ten times return of capital over five years.”). 
 105. See generally Interview by Sally Smith Hughes with Donald T. Valentine, Founder, Sequoia Cap., in 
Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 20, 2009), https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/roho/ucb/text/valentine_donald.pdf. 
 106. Norman, supra note 23. 
 107. Paul Gompers, William Gornall, Steven N. Kaplan & Ilya A. Strebulaev, How Do Venture Capitalists 
Make Decisions? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22587, 2016), https://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w22587.pdf (confirming through survey work that “VCs consider factors that include the attractiveness 
of the market, strategy, technology, product or service, customer adoption, competition, deal terms and the 
quality and experience of the management team. The nature of the entrepreneurial team is an important 
component of the sourcing and screening process”). 
 108. See Melissa De Witte, Venture Capital Funds Led by People of Color Face More Bias the Better They 
Perform, Stanford Researchers Find, STAN. NEWS (Aug. 12, 2019), https://news.stanford.edu/2019/08/12/race-
influences-professional-investors-judgments (“In their evaluations of high-performing venture capital funds, 
professional investors rate white-led teams more favorably than they do black-led teams with identical 
credentials . . . .”). 
 109. Cat Zakrzewski, VC Focus: Venture Industry’s ‘Pattern Matching’ Drives Bias, Critics Say, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 30, 2017, 9:26 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vc-focus-venture-industrys-pattern-matching-drives-
bias-critics-say-1509369994; Lisa Fisher, Stemming Implicit Bias in High-Tech STEM: The Vision of Project 
Include, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. SCI. 127 (2018). 
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which has implications for racial, gender, and class dynamics. Studies have 
proven that when a person looks similar to ourselves, we are inclined to 
automatically believe they are more trustworthy.110 Therefore, a white male 
investor is more likely to invest in a white male founder than, for example, a 
female founder of color. This is true, even if the business has high growth 
potential and high sales; the reality is that investors tend to bring founders into 
their portfolio that look like themselves, have the same status, and have the same 
levels of education.111 Additionally, physical appearance can guide donation or 
investment decisions not only in person-to-person networks, but even in an 
anonymous and seemingly democratic vehicle such as a crowdfunding 
campaign.112 This phenomenon is similar to the concept of “trust economics,” a 
longstanding theory about creating systems where trust becomes a placeholder 
for money.113 Investors rely on trust as they develop their financial relationships 
as startup investment opportunities come from a network of trusted business 
associates.114 What makes for a trusted relationship is informed by sources such 
as the investor’s family and friends, many of whom fit a certain demographic. 
This “network of trust” serves an important screening function for who gets 
funding and who does not.115 Essentially these investors are deciding who is like 
them and therefore worthy of both the investors’ trust and money. Trust 
economics as an investment principle within the startup ecosystem favors white 
entrepreneurs, since investors are likely to also be white.116 These important 
decisions based on trust are made regardless of metrics and in the face of 
contrary metrics since women-led businesses are more profitable117 and diverse 
teams are more profitable.118 Even though the empirical analysis supports the 
 
 110. Farmer et al., supra note 81, at 290–92; Damian A. Stanley, Peter Sokol-Hessner, Mahzarin R. Banaji 
& Elizabeth A. Phelps, Implicit Race Attitudes Predict Trustworthiness Judgments and Economic Trust 
Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7710, 7711 (2011). 
 111. See KATHRYN FINNEY, THE REAL UNICORNS OF TECH: BLACK WOMEN FOUNDERS 7 (2016). 
 112. See Joe Pinsker, How to Succeed in Crowdfunding: Be Thin, White, and Attractive, ATLANTIC (Aug. 
3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/crowdfunding-success-kickstarter-kiva-
succeed/400232/ (“Regardless of whether such bias is conscious or unconscious, the researchers had a guess as 
to why some users were being swayed by physical characteristics. ‘We argue that implicit discrimination may 
characterize lending decisions on Kiva [a crowdfunding site], because of the dizzying array of choices available 
and the lack of any obvious decision criteria for making a funding choice,’ they write. Without anything else to 
go on, users default to old stereotypes.”). 
 113. The Trust Economy, ATLANTIC (2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/sponsored/charles-schwab-2017-
nt/the-trust-economy/1290. 
 114. Ibrahim, supra note 93, at 1432. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See DELOITTE, VC HUMAN CAPITAL SURVEY 7 (3d ed. 2021), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/ 
audit/articles/diversity-venture-capital-human-capital-survey.html (click “Download the PDF” to download). 
 117. Katie Abouzahr, Matt Krentz, John Harthorne & Frances Brooks Taplett, Why Women-Owned Startips 
Are a Better Bet, BOS. CONSULTING GRP. (June 6, 2018), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2018/why-women-
owned-startups-are-better-bet (“[B]usinesses founded by women ultimately deliver higher revenue—more than 
twice as much per dollar invested—than those founded by men, making women-owned companies better 
investments for financial backers.”). 
 118. Sundiatu Dixon-Fyle, Kevin Dolan, Vivian Hunt & Sara Prince, Diversity Wins: How Inclusion 
Matters, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 19, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-
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financing of more diverse entrepreneurs, the market still invests in a pattern that 
benefits white male entrepreneurs.  
Further, when an investor evaluates a founder, it is common for the investor 
to evaluate both the founder and the company based on a frame of reference 
from past deals, other successful founders, or deals that they have heard about. 
Using this frame of reference as a basis for investment decisionmaking is known 
as “pattern matching.” In the entrepreneurial ecosystem, pattern matching is a 
term used to explain the practice of investors, primarily angel or venture capital 
investors, to evaluate startups and entrepreneurs based on what has worked in 
the past.119  For example, John Doerr, a famous investor and partner in the 
venture capital firm of Kleiner Perkins, illustrated this point in a public 
presentation when he said that the most successful tech entrepreneurs are “white, 
male, nerds.”120 He then went on to say, “That correlates more with any other 
success factor that I’ve seen in the world’s greatest entrepreneurs. If you look at 
[Amazon founder Jeff] Bezos, or [Netscape founder Marc] Andreessen, [Yahoo 
co-founder] David Filo, the founders of Google, they all seem to be white, male, 
nerds who’ve dropped out of Harvard or Stanford and they absolutely have no 
social life. So, when I see that pattern coming in—which was true of Google—
it was very easy to decide to invest.”121 It is unlikely given the statistics about 
entrepreneurs of color in the startup space that investors have a frame of 
reference for a Black founder or a founder of color. Rather investors look for 
founders that pattern match to previous unicorn founders. Because the investor 
has no frame of reference for a Black founder, the founder does not match the 
pattern, and it is unlikely that the investor will take a chance and invest in a 
nontraditional entrepreneur.122 
The next Subpart describes how Silicon Valley thrives on the mythology 
surrounding a founder and how the culture of celebrating the next messianic 
“wunderkind” is not only dangerous, it reinforces the pattern matching described 
above and surfaces how the brilliant founder myth was one of the drivers of 
Holmes’ success at fundraising.  
C. THE CULT OF PERSONALITY AND THE MYTH OF THE BRILLIANT 
FOUNDER123 
Silicon Valley has historically fed in to cultivating a mystique around its 
legendary founders—Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, and Elon Musk, 
 
inclusion/diversity-wins-how-inclusion-matters# (“The most diverse companies are now more likely than ever 
to outperform less diverse peers on profitability.”). 
 119. See Zakrzewski, supra note 109. 
 120. Scott Austin, Doerr and Mortiz Stir VCs in One-on-One Showdown, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2008, 11:59 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121025688414577219. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Norman, supra note 23. 
 123. See Touve & Glinska, supra note 42 (“[The myth of the brilliant founder] goes something like this: a 
brilliant, ambitious tech wiz—clearly born to be an entrepreneur and predictably male—has a light-bulb moment. 
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for example.124 Within startup culture, there is a cult of personality that has the 
effect of creating a pattern of a narrow image of who can be a founder, who can 
sit on a board, and who can be an investor in the race to pursue a unicorn.125 
Silicon Valley culture perpetuates this cult of personality within the startup 
community. Arguably this myth of the brilliant founder emerged from the fabled 
idiosyncrasies of Steve Jobs and Mark Zuckerberg.126 As investors start to invest 
in ventures, they place a primacy on finding “the next Zuckerberg” or the “next 
Steve Jobs.”127  In other words, they are looking to replicate the success of 
Facebook and of Apple and believe that it comes in the form of a founder that is 
white, male, and awkward like either Mark Zuckerberg or Steve Jobs.128 
The cult of personality is a heuristic born of pattern matching. One 
particular pattern that is attractive to investors is the pattern match of the twenty-
something-year-old Stanford or Harvard drop-out with a world-changing idea. 
As a result, a narrow image of who can be a game-changing founder or CEO has 
emerged and there is little opportunity for different perspective or different 
patterns. This pattern replicates elitism and structural racism by reinforcing the 
idea that those who would consider dropping out of Ivy League institutions are 
likely people who have enough money and privilege to see that choice as not 
 
He drops out of college and bets everything on a startup, which ends up changing the world while generating 
massive wealth.”). 
 124. See generally Isobel Asher Hamilton, This Doomsaying Art Exhibition Recasts Bezos, Musk, and 
Zuckerberg as Mythological Figures Heralding the End of Civilization, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2019, 12:00 
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/3-d-printed-exhibition-reimagines-bezos-musk-and-zuckerberg-as-
mythological-figures-2019-4. 
 125. Sheila Herrling, The Myth of the Entrepreneur, CASE FOUND. (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://casefoundation.org/blog/the-myth-of-the-entrepreneur (discussing the vast majority of celebrated 
startups continuing to be founded and funded by “white, well-educated, well-networked males”); Ian Hathaway, 
The Myth of the Young Startup Founder, CTR. FOR AM. ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://startupsusa.org/the-myth-of-the-young-startup-founder/ (addressing the myth of founder age and 
deeming founders to be much older than presumed (around mid-40s on average)). 
The vast majority of today’s celebrated startups continue to be founded and funded by white, well-
educated, well-networked males. Women are at the helm of 30 percent of all businesses in the US, 
and these businesses are leading the way in terms of hiring and growth. However, startups with 
women CEOs still receive only three percent of venture capital funding. Minority-owned businesses 
are growing at a faster clip than non-minority owned businesses, but are receiving an even smaller 
fraction of investments. 
Herrling, supra; see also Touve & Glinska, supra note 42 (“Having examined the genesis stories around tech’s 
biggest breakthroughs, Touve dispels the common misconception that entrepreneurs are born, not made. He also 
suggests that there are four archetypes of the iconic founder: the genius, the guru, the gambler and the 
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 126. See Isaac Cabe, 6 Famous Tech Gurus and Their Less-Known Crazy Habits, CRACKED (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.cracked.com/article_25137_6-famous-tech-gurus-and-their-less-known-crazy-habits.html; see 
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 127. See Doug Gross, Who Is the Next Steve Jobs (And Is There One)?, CNN (Oct. 3, 2012, 9:34 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2012/10/02/tech/innovation/next-steve-jobs/index.html. 
 128. This form of pattern matching is common in fundraising. The term “pattern-matching” originated from 
computer science, and it describes the matching and locating of specific sequences of data of some pattern among 
raw data or a sequence of tokens. Definition: Pattern Matching, EDUCATIVE, https://www.educative.io/ 
edpresso/definition-pattern-matching (last visited May 21, 2021).  
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much of a lifelong risk. This is likely because they can always get back into an 
elite institution, always pay for it, their parents will support them in the interim, 
or they won’t be perceived as irresponsible or ruining their life. Therefore, those 
who are considered “super smart” Ivy League dropouts with a big idea are likely 
going to be a white, privileged person. 
Although the numbers are on the rise, successful founders of color are 
largely absent in entrepreneurship because of a demonstrated lack of access to 
capital.129 It is not just lack of access to capital, it is also the lack of inclusion of 
Black founders in the space. Many entrepreneurs of color do not have access to 
the traditionally white, male investors and advisors that Holmes relied on for 
funding Theranos. Generally, white (mostly male) entrepreneurs have more 
access to capital than any other group.130 Venture capital firms employ mostly 
white men and then invest almost exclusively in companies owned by white 
men.131 One percent of American venture capital-backed founders are Black and 
the percentage of Black people in decisionmaking roles within venture capital is 
not much better.132 These numbers are relevant given the nature and role of 
pattern matching and cult of personality (described below) at play in private 
fundraising.133 This bias stems from barriers to early-stage capital and a lack of 
representation in the investing space and is perpetuated by systems of racism 
that destroy opportunity within communities of color.134 Fundraising culture and 
practices created an inherent funding bias.135  
 
 129. See GEE & PECK, supra note 84, at 3. 
 130. See Elizabeth MacBride, Is Entrepreneurship Becoming the Purview of Upper-Class Men?, FORBES 
(May 31, 2019, 2:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethmacbride/2019/05/31/is-entrepreneurship-
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through a Kauffman Foundation report); HWANG ET AL., supra note 61, at 10–14. 
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MARKETWATCH (Feb. 13, 2019, 1:43 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/venture-capitalists-still-give-
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 132. Azevedo, supra note 57.  
 133. See Sarah Lyons-Padilla, Hazel Rose Markus, Ashby Monk, Sid Radhakrishna, Radhika Shah, Norris 
A. “Daryn” Dodson IV & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Race Influences Professional Investors’ Financial Judgments, 
116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17225, 17226 (2019) (“[I]n the world of investing, high-performing teams led by 
people of color are a rarity, and they fail to fit the template of what a successful fund manager looks like.”). Even 
after first getting in the door, groups stereotyped as incompetent (for example, Black people) have a harder time 
advancing professionally than groups stereotyped as competent (for example, white people). Because having a 
strong track records is inconsistent with stereotypes about funds owned by people of color, asset allocators might 
be unable to recognize and appropriately evaluate these teams. Instead, they may fall back on pattern matching 
strategies and mitigate risk by sticking with familiar options—that is to say, by continuing to invest in white and 
male teams. 
 134. See id. at 17225–26. 
 135. See id. While this study does not address a connection between racial bias and funding startups, it 
speaks to a general racial bias in fundraising practices and culture, finding that: 
At stronger performance levels, asset allocators rate White-led funds more favorably than they do 
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systemic racial disparities in how investors evaluate funds and allocate money. 
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Implicit bias is a form of the more general phenomenon of pattern 
matching. Because the line between aspiration and reality is blurred and, as 
described above, is likely obscured by founders to potential investors, investors 
rely on their gut and pattern matching, which can lead to implicit bias.136 For 
example, the investor believes that the founder may be a worthy investment 
because the founder dresses like Mark Zuckerberg or shares idiosyncratic traits 
as those of Steve Jobs, and therefore the investor is willing to bet on that founder 
based on those characteristics. 137 The “worthy” founder likely went to the right 
higher education institutions, as a result has sponsors or mentors from the right 
echelons to endorse them, and access to financial and cultural capital. Silicon 
Valley’s cultural practices build on the socio-economic and racial forces that 
have built wealth for certain populations while literally devaluing others. The 
import of this is that despite the emphasis that Silicon Valley places on 
innovation and disruption of the status quo, the culture of Silicon Valley builds 
on the existing dominant racial and class practices to the detriment of 
entrepreneurs of color. In other words, the same ways that racial, social, and 
class hierarchies show up in larger society, they are equally reflected in Silicon 
Valley. Thus, those who do not have similar characteristics as the hegemonic 
participants in Silicon Valley culture—that is, women and founders of color—
face challenges in accessing capital.138 
Bias in the private investment system defies the logic of capitalism.139 
There is an unrecognized downside to pattern matching and implicit bias in this 
space. Pattern recognition has enabled venture capitalists to mitigate risk but has 
also limited their profit potential. In 2016, the Center for Global Policy Solutions 
reported that due to discriminatory financing practices and a bias towards 
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companies primarily operated by white males, America is losing out on over 1.1 
million minority-owned businesses, and as a result, foregoing over 9 million 
potential jobs and $300 billion in collective national income.140 
D. APPLYING FUNDRAISER AND FOUNDER INCENTIVES TO THERANOS AND 
OTHER UNICORN COMPANIES 
 Research shows that board diversity can be an effective safeguard against 
bad apples. 141  Diversity helps boards prevent problems and prevents 
comfortability with business practices as well as opens them up to new ideas. 
Companies with more gender diversity on their boards, for example, are less 
likely to reissue financial statements because of error or fraud. Diverse groups 
also tend to consider more factors when making a decision. Racially mixed 
juries deliberate longer, share more information, discuss a wider range of 
relevant factors and even make fewer mistakes when recalling facts about a 
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investor activist campaigns that tend to diminish diversity) (“Board diversity helps promote social justice by 
ensuring that corporate leaders reflect the diversity of all corporate constituencies and the wider society. In 
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diverse a board, the more effective the defense.” (footnotes omitted)). Researchers have found that the following 
benefits are associated with gender-diverse corporate boards:  
• Effective risk-management practices. Adding women to a board can improve investment 
efficiency and prevent risky overinvestment decisions as well as reduce the overconfidence of male 
CEOs.  
• Increased engagement among board members, including behavior like requesting additional 
information or updates on subjects being discussed and acting on specific tasks after board 
meetings.  
• Fewer financial reporting mistakes and controversial business practices such as fraud and 
earnings manipulation.  
• Investment in higher-quality audits.  
Companies with gender-diverse management teams experience fewer operations-related lawsuits.  
Why Diversity and Inclusion Matter: Quick Take, supra; see also Wahid, supra, at 706 (“Using a sample of 6132 
unique firms over the period from 2000 to 2010, I find, consistent with the hypothesis, gender diversity to be 
associated with a lower likelihood of financial manipulation, even after controlling for firm-specific factors (firm-
fixed effects) and factoring in endogeneity issues through an instrumental variable approach.”). 
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case. Ironically, lab experiments show that while homogenous groups do less 
well on complex tasks, the report feeling more confident about their 
decisions.142 
However, board diversity is an afterthought.143 Larry Fink, the Chief Executive 
Officer of BlackRock, a global investment firm which manages $6.3 trillion in 
assets, opined in an open letter to chief executive officers that diverse boards 
result in “a more aware and diverse mindset. They are less likely to succumb to 
groupthink or miss new threats to a company’s business model. And they are 
better able to identify opportunities that promote long-term growth.144 
The lack of Board and investor diversity may have contributed to 
Theranos’ fraud. From its incorporation in 2003 until 2018, Holmes was the 
company’s Chief Executive Officer. 145  She recruited her former chemical 
engineering professor at Stanford to serve as its first Board member.146 Through 
the life of the company, Theranos had on its Board some of the country’s great 
citizens. She recruited former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to join the 
Board, and he would become one of her biggest champions even when his own 
grandson, who was briefly employed by Theranos as a researcher, revealed 
himself to be a whistleblower regarding Theranos’ research practices in its 
lab.147 George Shultz also played a role in recruiting an all-star board of former 
military experts and diplomats, which included former U.S. Secretary of 
Defense William Perry, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former 
U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, former U.S. Senator and heart-transplant surgeon Bill 
Frist, Admiral George Roughead, and former U.S. Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis.148  The Board also included an all-star cast of executives, including 
former Wells Fargo Chairman Richard Kovacevich, former CEO of Bechtel 
Group Riley Bechtel, venture capitalist and former CEO of Oracle Don Lucas,149 
and the founder and chairman of Boies Schiller Flexner, David Boies.150 From 
 
 142. Chris Clearfield & Andras Tilcsik, Opinion, How Board Diversity Might Have Prevented the Theranos 
Fiasco, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-
commentary/how-board-diversity-might-have-prevented-the-theranos-fiasco/article38304767/. 
 143. Sukhinder Singh Cassidy, Board Diversity Still Stumbling Block to Good Governance, INFO. (Nov. 28, 
2017, 6:45 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/board-diversity-still-stumbling-block-to-good-
governance. 
 144.  Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/a-sense-of-purpose/. 
 145. Pflanzer, supra note 11. 
 146. Simon Firth, The Not-so-Retiring Retirement of Channing Robertson, STAN. ENG’G (Feb. 28, 2012), 
https://engineering.stanford.edu/news/not-so-retiring-retirement-channing-robertson. 
 147. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 184–200. 
 148. Lydia Ramsey Pflanzer, How Elizabeth Holmes Convinced Powerful Men Like Henry Kissinger, James 
Mattis, and George Shultz to Sit on the Board of Now Disgraced Blood-Testing Startup Theranos, BUS. INSIDER 
(Mar. 19, 2019, 6:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/theranos-former-board-members-henry-kissinger-
george-shultz-james-mattis-2019-3. 
 149. Don Lucas was a founding investor who would also become Chairman of the Board at one point. See 
CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 2. 
 150. James B. Stewart, David Boies Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/09/21/business/david-boies-pleads-not-guilty.html. 
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this list of Board members, Holmes had recruited a group of august and powerful 
citizens, but no health tech experts, medical professionals, or other similar 
experts. 
Before the scandal that would reveal the company’s claims to be fraudulent 
broke, the Theranos Board was a high-powered and high-profile group who was 
enthralled by Holmes, referring to her as a visionary, revolutionary, ethereal, and 
akin to Beethoven.151 A look at the Board composition reveals that, other than 
Elizabeth and Sunny Balwani, every single Board member—for the ten-year 
duration of the company—was a white man.152 And every one of those directors 
was over the age of sixty-five. 153  The average age of Theranos’ Board of 
Directors was eighty years old. 154  In addition, the majority shared some 
affiliation with Stanford University, through the Hoover Institute on Stanford’s 
campus where several Board members were appointed Hoover Fellows.155 The 
homogenous Board composition may have contributed to the multitude of 
factors that enabled Holmes and Balwani to mislead investors, which included 
problems related to implicit bias, pattern matching, and the cult of personality 
that saw investors, employees, and board members blindly following her and 
throwing millions of dollars at a company whose claims would later turn out to 
be fraudulent. The orientation of the Board contributed to the embrace of the 
standard narrative and pattern matching that says who a successful founder is 
and what one looks like.156 
Given the collective resume of the Board of Directors and Holmes’ 
advisers, the inability of the Board to properly supervise and oversee the 
operation of the company is troubling.157 Although the Board was a high-profile 
group, there was a glaring lack of diversity in almost all areas—race, gender, 
and age—and subject matter expertise. The lack of diversity could have been a 
reason for why the deception went unnoticed for so long. The intimate nature of 
the relationships among the investors reduced the amount of due diligence that 
 
 151. Pflanzer, supra note 148; Ken Auletta, Blood, Simpler, NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2014), 
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 152. See Pflanzer, supra note 148. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Pamela Wasley, The Theranos Crisis: Where Was the Board?, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2016, 3:57 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2016/04/27/the-theranos-crisis-where-was-the-board/ 
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 155. Richard Beales, Theranos Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
10/28/business/dealbook/theranos-under-fire.html.  
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motivated reasoning . . . . Research shows we also interpret facts differently if they challenge our personal 
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was conducted before investments were made.158 The attention to detail that 
might have been shown by a more outwardly diverse board was not shown by 
the Theranos Board of Directors. In other words, it is likely that the similarities 
shared among the Board created a false sense of security and allowed for 
Holmes’ deception to go undetected. This group of older, white men, mostly 
affiliated with Stanford, in some way created an environment where they never 
questioned the veracity of Holmes’ research or her promises.159 
Theranos is not just a story about malfeasance of one founder, but one that 
profoundly illustrates the ways in which race, class, and implicit bias play out in 
startup’s culture of chasing unicorn status. The fact that investors were willing 
to blindly invest money in Holmes’ company, and that board members 
championed her without question, despite the fact that she was a nineteen-year-
old dropout with no business, healthcare, or engineering experience at the helm, 
is a strong statement on the role that homogeneity played in why the company’s 
investors and its Board were not as critical of Holmes and consistently gave her 
the benefit of the doubt. 
As described above, there is ample evidence to suggest that entrepreneurial 
fundraising ability is often tied to race and class, and investors ascribe an 
inordinate amount of credit to the mythical “brilliant founder,” which is likely 
the result of lack of diversity and implicit bias. It is possible that with certain 
high-growth startup companies, race and class bias are the cause of the 
fundraising success. Perhaps evaluated in the absence of implicit biases, these 
companies truly were the most meritorious when pitched to investors. However, 
there are dramatic racial, gender, and class differences across startup funding, 
innovation levels, profitability, and the economy as a whole. Seemingly, the 
structural inequities in larger society are replicated in the startup community.160 
 
 158. See Ibrahim, supra note 93, at 1432. 
 159. See Pflanzer, supra note 148 (highlighting the relationships and experiences between board members 
and Holmes).  
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The cult of personality dictates who gets funded, but also who is the face 
of the company through senior management. Holmes clearly understood this and 
went to great lengths to create an image of herself and of a company that matched 
a pattern of a typical successful unicorn startup. For example, she took to 
dressing in all black, modeling herself after Steve Jobs.161 She brought Avie 
Tevanian, senior software engineer of Apple, on board early on in the company’s 
start, ostensibly luring him away from Apple to increase the credibility of 
Theranos. 162  She also rented office space for Theranos in Facebook’s old 
offices.163 She likely did all of these things because she recognized the outsized 
importance placed on pattern matching, as opposed to a viable product. Holmes 
tapped into some of those idiosyncrasies and attempted to create a similar 
mystique about herself.164 She then benefited from and capitalized on this myth 
of the brilliant founder.  
Holmes, the “brilliant founder” of a company whose product never worked, 
raised historic amounts of private capital—approximately $700 million—from 
wealthy, successful venture capitalists and other prominent U.S. power 
brokers.165 She also secured lucrative contracts with Walgreens and Safeway, 
companies who agreed to create health and wellness centers within their stores 
that would deploy the Theranos devices.166 Yet behind closed doors, Theranos 
was in total disarray.167 The technology was failing, although arguably it never 
worked in the first place, and the company’s work culture was cloaked in secrecy 
and hostility. Turnover among key staff in the research and development 
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departments as well as the finance office occurred with alarming frequency.168 
Employees were subject to draconian nondisclosure agreements that were 
ruthlessly enforced.169  Despite repeated failures of the testing system, such 
information about the product’s failures was hidden (to varying degrees) from 
investors, customers, employees, and even Board members.170 Moreover, the 
company engaged in outright lies to avoid detection by federal and state 
regulators, including creating a secret laboratory and falsifying reports for the 
better part of a decade.171 
WeWork, a “global network of workspaces where companies and people 
grow together,”172 at the time of this writing, was a unicorn company recently 
fallen from grace, in eerily similar and parallel ways to Theranos.173 Although 
Theranos’ downfall was fraud, WeWork’s downfall was overconfidence, 
eccentricities, and incompetence. WeWork’s founder Adam Neuman promoted 
a cult of personality around his company and courted investors based on him 
presenting his view of the world and fostering a mystique about himself akin to 
the mythical brilliant founders of the past.174 WeWork reportedly was losing 
millions of dollars each month, but by the end of 2014, WeWork had raised more 
than half a billion dollars from venture capitalists.175 Many of Silicon Valley’s 
most prominent investors invested in the company. Eventually Softbank would 
invest $4.4 billion in the company, based not on financial estimates and analysis, 
but “on [WeWork’s] energy and spirituality.”176  
Theranos’ and WeWork’s seemingly unlikely trajectory establishes that 
both problematic fundraising practices and “brilliant founder” mythology are 
intertwined with race, gender, and class. The notion of questioning Black genius 
in ways that white founders are not questioned is problematic. It is unlikely that 
there could ever be a Black Elizabeth Holmes—an individual with no science 
background, raising billions of dollars on the claim that they could develop the 
Theranos technology.177 
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Not only do these fundraising practices and culture replicate societal 
inequities, but the use of implicit bias and the lack of diversity may possibly 
contribute to fraud and bad investment decisions. The lack of diversity among 
Theranos’ investors and the company’s Board likely contributed to hiding and 
overlooking the fraud.  
As is common practice in venture capital-backed startups, the members of 
the Theranos board were also investors in the company. They brought in their 
wealthy and powerful friends to invest in the startup as well. 178  This 
phenomenon is not unique in Silicon Valley, but the practice of bringing your 
friends on board to an opportunity does have implications for who gets funding 
when the wealthy gatekeepers lack diversity.179 The way in which Holmes was 
unfairly supported by a system designed to promote a certain class and type of 
entrepreneur demonstrates the role of implicit bias in the system. 
 Elizabeth Holmes’ gender played an outsized role in the narrative around 
her success and contributed to her being perceived as a brilliant founder. 180 As 
a female inventor at the helm of the company she founded, she was an anomaly 
in Silicon Valley and she represented a variation of the wunderkind theme. 
Holmes was lauded as a role model and a wunderkind because her presence in 
the startup world was disruptive of the male wunderkind archetype.181 
 Indeed, as a female founder, Holmes likely experienced gender 
discrimination, but she is also white and came from socio-economic privilege. 
As such, Holmes was able to move easily among the circles of elite power in 
Silicon Valley because the socioeconomic forces in Silicon Valley ran in her 
favor, as a white, well-educated, and connected woman. This multi-dimensional 
aspect of her identity is important here because, as a woman, her gender makes 
her a part of a subordinated group, but as an upper-class, white woman, her race, 
as well as her class background, elevates her to a dominant group.182 In other 
words, Holmes may have experienced gender discrimination, but as a wealthy, 
white woman of a certain class she also experienced racial and class privilege, 
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which she was able to leverage to push her company forward. The argument here 
is that her whiteness and wealthy connections played a larger role in her story 
than her gender and that her race and class helped her to overcome the challenges 
raised by her gender and, in fact, the multi-dimensional aspect of her story 
contributed to her popularity and praise.183 The fact that she was a woman only 
helped her to raise money and to continue to receive funding for her company. 
She used feminist and gendered language when it benefited her,184 and then 
fashioned herself in Steve Jobs’ image and lowered the register of her voice at 
other times to appear more masculine.185  Elizabeth Holmes’ success can be 
explained by her multidimensionality and the power dynamics of three 
important identities: race, class, and gender.186 Although she is a woman and 
women in entrepreneurship are rare, she is a white woman who counted herself 
among the upper class. The import of this is that any experience of 
entrepreneurship by her as an underrepresented minority is arguably trumped by 
the position afforded her in society by her race and class and raises the possibility 
that her race and class afforded her the privilege of avoiding discrimination 
based on gender. 187  She was able to expertly leverage her racial and class 
privileges to overcome any ill effects of gender discrimination. In effect, her role 
as a wealthy, white woman in Silicon Valley is marginal diversity, and a form 
of tokenism at best.188  
Juxtaposing her experience against entrepreneurs of color in Silicon 
Valley, there is a stark difference between Holmes’ experience of 
entrepreneurship and that of entrepreneurs of color. Entrepreneurs of color face 
systematic challenges to being a minority or an outsider to an insider’s club. The 
difficulties of fundraising are multi-dimensional and may include lack of social 
capital, access to a network, or any means to backchannel feedback or insider 
information when fundraising.189 In Holmes’ case, her parents gave her $50,000 
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from an education trust that they had put aside for her tuition at Stanford.190 She 
was given the benefit of the doubt at every turn. She was unfairly propped up by 
a system designed to promote a certain class and type of entrepreneur. Holmes’ 
success in raising capital remains a lesson in the ways that race, privilege, and 
wealth dictate startup success. Startup culture along with the private markets 
enabled the meteoric rise of Theranos. The closed market system of private 
capital in Silicon Valley is the backbone of entrenching homogeneity.191 
The lore around her family’s pedigree acted as a form of pattern matching. 
The pattern is that investors convinced themselves that they know what elite 
success looks like and that it looks like Elizabeth Holmes’ family history. Her 
parents were Christian and Noel Holmes. 192  On her father’s side, she is 
descended from Charles Louis Fleischmann, a Hungarian immigrant who 
founded the Fleischmann Yeast Company. 193  The yeast company’s success 
turned Fleischmann’s family into one of the wealthiest families in America.194 
Charles’ daughter, Bettie Fleischmann, married Dr. Christian Holmes. Dr. 
Holmes was Elizabeth’s great-great-grandfather. 195  He helped to found 
Cincinnati General Hospital and the University of Cincinnati Medical School.196 
In the context of Theranos and Elizabeth Holmes’ story, much would be made 
of Elizabeth’s family tree and her family’s connections.197 Among the media and 
her investors, through the connection to entrepreneurship and to medicine, it was 
implied that Elizabeth was destined to found Theranos, a medical startup, since 
she had inherited both medical and entrepreneurial genes from her grandfather 
and great-great-grandfather.198 This logic is essentially dynastic—that children 
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to be president of the company.’ But there’s an important distinction. That’s what I felt when I 
[first] met her. After spending a lot more time with her, I learned her great-grandfather was an 
entrepreneur and started Fleischmann’s—packaged yeast. It was very successful. So that was one 
side, that’s the entrepreneur side, but she was in the medical side. Ah! It turns out later, the hospital 
very near where they lived is named after her great uncle who was involved with medicine. So she 
came by both of the two talents necessary here, one medicine and the other entrepreneurship, quite 
naturally. You could just see it the way she handles things, the way she thinks. 
Id.; see also Makalintal, supra note 179. 
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of elites are presumptively worthy of access to capital and leadership 
positions.199 
For Holmes in particular, her pedigree also created a bit of a mystique about 
her and fed into her cult of personality. In the HBO documentary film The 
Inventor, Theranos chairman Don Lucas said that he knew that when he met 
Holmes, then a twenty-two-year-old startup founder, she “came by it naturally” 
(because her ancestor was an entrepreneur and her great-great-grandfather a 
famous doctor).200 This statement seems to convey that to Don Lucas, it was her 
bloodline, not her work, that mattered to him as he considered an investment.201 
In fact, her pedigree and not necessarily her product is why Don Lucas invested 
in the company.202  
Further, Board member George Shultz referred to Holmes as “the next 
Steve Jobs or Bill Gates” in a Wall Street Journal interview.203 This article 
spawned the next wave of funding and sparked the $6 billion valuation. In 2014, 
she made a claim that she was developing a $100 million partnership with the 
U.S. Defense Department.204 There was no evidence to this claim, but it was 
reported on and repeated.205 This focus on the cult of personality, the idea that 
she might be the “next Steve Jobs or Bill Gates” gave her cover for her fraudulent 
 
 199. See Henry Farrell, David Brooks Has a Point—Upper Class Kids Have Invisible Cultural Advantages, 
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (July 11, 2017, 8:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2015/09/23/why-are-working-class-kids-less-likely-to-get-elite-jobs-they-study-too-hard-at-college 
(providing a statement from Lauren Rivera, Associate Professor at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School 
of Management) (“Whether intentionally or not, elite parents expose their children to different experiences and 
styles of interacting that are useful for getting ahead in society. Many of these are taken for granted in upper and 
upper-middle class circles, such as how to prepare a college application (and having cultivated the right types of 
accomplishments to impress admissions officers), how to network in a business setting in a way that seems 
natural, and how to develop rapport with teachers, interviewers, and other gatekeepers to get things you want 
from those in power. Basically, if we think of economic inequality as a sporting competition, elite parents give 
their kids a leg up, not only by being able to afford the equipment necessary to play but also by teaching them 
the rules of the game and giving them insider tips on how to win.”); see also David Brooks, Bobos in Paradise: 
The New Upper Class Rules and How They Got There, 33 STAN. CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQUALITY 304 (2000), 
https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/media/_media/pdf/key_issues/elites_journalism.pdf (exploring 
the generational rise of elites through the descriptions of brides and grooms in the New York Times weddings 
page). 
 200. The Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley, supra note 24.  
 201. Id. 
 202. See Eliana Dockterman, Elizabeth Holmes Got Where She Was Through Privilege. A New 
Documentary About Her Doesn’t See That, TIME (Mar. 14, 2019, 6:16 AM), https://time.com/5551319/the-
inventor-documentary-review (“The men she hustled were probably seduced by her pedigree; in the film, 
Theranos chairman Don Lucas says that he knew Holmes, then a 22-year-old startup founder, ‘came by it 
naturally’ because her great-grandfather was an entrepreneur and her great-uncle a famous doctor—as if her 
bloodline, not her work, was what mattered.”); see also Gompers et al., supra note 107. 
 203. Joseph Rago, Elizabeth Holmes: The Breakthrough of Instant Diagnosis, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/elizabeth-holmes-the-breakthrough-of-instant-diagnosis-1378526813. 
 204. United States v. Holmes, No. 5:18-CR-00258-EJD, 2020 WL 666563, at *2, *13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 
2020); see also Press Release, supra note 31.  
 205. Press Release, supra note 31 (“In truth, Theranos’ technology was never deployed by the U.S. 
Department of Defense and generated a little more than $100,000 in revenue from operations in 2014.”). 
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claims because she was essentially vouched for time and time again by a member 
of the elite startup world.  
This type of fundraising culture is what propelled Theranos to such success 
in raising capital. The normalized practice of founders obscuring facts and 
inflating claims in pursuit of fundraising capital played deeply in Elizabeth 
Holmes’ favor. Patrick O’Neill, the media and ad representative from Chiat\Day, 
the company Theranos hired for publicity, described his experience with 
Theranos in an interview stating that “all tech startups were chaotic and 
secretive.”206 Despite the chaos and secrecy or the fact that her product did not 
work, Holmes was able to successfully fundraise. Knowing what we now know 
about the failure of the Theranos product, the fact that she was able to raise 
money in record-breaking numbers is an indictment of the vaporware culture 
described above. Because of the lack of evidence of her experience and 
expertise, one can only draw the conclusion that the intrigue of her story, along 
with her race, background, and connections, propelled her forward absent 
concrete factual projections.207 The company ultimately raised $700 million in 
the private market from investors who committed capital often without 
reviewing audited financial statements, taking the company to a peak valuation 
of $9 billion.208 This method of fundraising based on vaporware has the effect 
of reinforcing structural racism. The presumptions against people of color 
function much differently than with white founders. 209  Through this lens, 
vaporware is another way to demonstrate the closed system that will vouch for 
white founders even when their product doesn’t work. 
The allure of Theranos was that it was a seemingly innovative company 
with a mission to disrupt the diagnostic lab industry by providing low-cost blood 
testing services. The hype around the startup was that the company was making 
a major breakthrough in the large blood-testing market, where the U.S. 
diagnostic-lab industry posts annual sales of over $70 billion. 210  Theranos 
claimed its technology was revolutionary because it had developed devices to 
automate and miniaturize blood tests using microscopic blood volumes.211 The 
company’s tests required only about 1/100 to 1/1,000 of the amount of blood 
that would ordinarily be needed and cost far less than existing tests.212 Theranos 
 
 206. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 160. 
 207. See Kitanya Harrison, Elizabeth Holmes and the Dangers of White Feminism, MEDIUM (Mar. 22, 
2019), https://medium.com/@kitanyaharrison/elizabeth-holmes-and-the-dangers-of-white-feminism-
699cfe6333a3 (opining that Holmes took advantage of her identity to grain traction for her startup). 
 208. Francine McKenna, The Last Days of Theranos—The Financials Were as Overhyped as the Blood 
Tests, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 20, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-last-days-of-
theranos-the-financials-were-as-overhyped-as-the-blood-tests-2018-10-16. 
 209. See, e.g., Courtney Rubin, What It’s Like to Be a Black Entrepreneur Right Now, MARKER (June 16, 
2020), https://marker.medium.com/what-its-like-to-be-a-black-entrepreneur-right-now-509373dee85a. 
 210. Nickie Louise, Theranos Is Finally Shutting Down After Investors Lost Nearly $1 Billion, 
TECHSTARTUPS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://techstartups.com/2018/09/05/theranos-finally-shutting-investors-lost-
nearly-1-billion. 
 211. Rago, supra note 203. 
 212. See Parloff, supra note 9. 
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dubbed its blood collection vessel the “nanotainer” and its analysis machine the 
“Edison.”213 The company’s mission was compelling to investors because blood 
draws are painful, costly, and time consuming, and many patients want results 
quickly.  
Elizabeth Holmes traded on the theme of disruption and innovation. 
Theranos’ marketing and Holmes’ pitch capitalized on the idea that Theranos’ 
technology would revolutionize the staid blood-testing market. In fact, its 
vaunted technology turned out to be a sham and, in reality, Theranos performed 
tests using competitors’ machines. In interviews, Holmes underscored that 
“Theranos’ proprietary technology could take a pinprick’s worth of blood, 
extracted from the tip of a finger, instead of intravenously, and test for hundreds 
of diseases—a remarkable innovation that was going to save millions of lives 
and, in a phrase that [Elizabeth Holmes] often repeated, ‘change the world.’”214 
The theme of changing the world was what investors, partners, and employees 
interviewed after the fact would say had lured them in to the company.215 
Before the sham was revealed, the claims of innovation and revolutionizing 
blood testing, with little or no documented evidence to support the claims, were 
enough to persuade former Safeway CEO Steven Burd to partner with 
Theranos. 216  In 2012, Safeway invested $350 million into retrofitting 800 
Safeway locations with clinics that would offer in-store blood tests. However, 
after many missed deadlines and questionable results from a trial clinic at 
Safeway’s corporate offices, the deal was called off in 2015.217  
In September 2013, Theranos also partnered with Walgreens to offer in-
store blood tests at more than forty Walgreens locations with plans to expand its 
“wellness centers” across the United States.218 Like Safeway, Walgreens wanted 
in on innovation and Walgreens’ senior executives pushed through the deal with 
 
 213. Norman A. Paradis, The Rise and Fall of Theranos, SCI. AM. (Apr. 22, 2016), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-rise-and-fall-of-theranos/. 
 214. Bilton, supra note 164. 
 215. See Monica Torres, 4 Ways Elizabeth Holmes Manipulated Her Theranos Employees, HUFFPOST (Mar. 
22, 2019, 12:57 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/elizabeth-holmes-office-employees_l_5c92abe3e4 
b01b140d351b6f. 
 216. See John Carreyrou, From Startup to Meltdown: The Unraveling of Theranos, WHARTON (July 17, 
2018), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-secrets-and-lies-that-sunk-theranos (explaining that 
Holmes courted Burd for the partnership before he retired in 2013, but the executives that succeeded him were 
more skeptical about Theranos). 
 217. Carreyrou, supra note 166. A sad coda to this story is that of the Safeway Vice President, whose 
husband had cancer. She greenlit the Theranos partnership in part because she was hopeful that the company 
would help millions of people suffering with illness. David Shaywitz, Learning the Right Lesson from Theranos: 
Fraud Is Bad, Wanting to Disrupt Healthcare Isn’t, FORBES (June 4, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/davidshaywitz/2018/06/04/learning-the-right-lesson-from-theranos-fraud-is-bad-wanting-to-disrupt-
healthcare-isnt/?sh=2337c76b60c7. 
 218. See John Soat, Walgreens CIO: We Intend to Be a Leader in Healthcare Technology, FORBES (Nov. 
17, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/2014/11/17/walgreens-cio-we-intend-to-be-a-leader-
in-healthcare-technology/#44223bca543e. 
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Theranos under pressure to best CVS’ minute clinic.219 Walgreens executives 
ignored the private consultant’s warnings and concerns based on the assurances 
of Holmes’ Board. The same phenomenon occurred with the Safeway 
decisionmakers.220 Holmes had an uncanny ability to bring people in and get 
them to believe that Theranos’ technology could completely revolutionize how 
effective health care is delivered. She was able to draw people in—investors, 
board members, employees, and partners—based off the strength of her claims 
of changing the world.221 The real story, however, was a little more complicated. 
In addition to her success stemming from investors compelled by her narrative 
of revolutionizing the medical industry, Holmes’ connections, her cultural 
capital, and the overall startup culture of deception were also reasons for 
Theranos’ success.  
The next Part describes the private markets’ role in protecting founders and 
propelling star companies forward and how the private fundraising market 
perpetuates the racial wealth gap and mirrors the structural barriers and 
inequities in larger society. Taken together, the fundraising culture and the 
private market’s role combine to entrench mostly white men over any other 
group when it comes to dominating the startup market. 
II.  THE MODEL UNICORN TURNS BAD: THE PRIVATE MARKET’S ROLE 
The private investment market is the wealthy and influential sector 
responsible for crowning unicorns.222 In the private markets, investors are often 
given equity in startup companies in exchange for funding.223 These investors 
include venture capital investors, angel investors, and individual investors that 
 
 219. See Amelia Lucas, Ex-Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes ‘Really Did Believe’ She Was Helping the 
World, Bad Blood Author Says, CNBC (Aug. 22, 2018, 7:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/22/ex-
theranos-ceo-holmes-believed-she-was-helping-the-world-author-says.html (providing a statement from 
Carreyrou that “[Walgreens was] so afraid that Theranos would turn around and strike a deal with their rival, 
their arch-rival, CVS that they just ignored their own in-house consultant,” who alerted Walgreens of his 
suspicions in late 2010). 
 220. James Markarian, How to Avoid Making Catastrophic Innovation Bets, VENTUREBEAT (June 8, 2019, 
12:12 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/06/08/how-to-avoid-making-catastrophic-innovation-bets (“By the 
time Theranos had been exposed as a sham, Safeway had dumped $350 million into the partnership—nearly half 
of its net income in 2012—and built clinics in over 800 stores.”). 
 221. See How a Silicon Valley Breakthrough Failed the Basic Test of Innovation, CHICAGO TRIB. (June 13, 
2016, 4:40 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-theranos-walgreen-holmes-edit-0614-
md-20160613-story.html (mentioning Holmes’ persuasive salesmanship). 
 222. Davide Scigliuzzo, Kelsey Butler & Sally Bakewell, Everything Is Private Equity Now, BLOOMBERG: 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 8, 2019, 1:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-10-03/how-private-
equity-works-and-took-over-everything (“The business [of private equity] has made billionaires out of many of 
its founders. Funds have snapped up businesses from pet stores to doctors’ practices to newspapers. PE firms 
may also be deep into real estate, loans to businesses, and startup investments—but the heart of their craft is 
using debt to acquire companies and sell them later.”). 
 223. James Chen, Private Equity, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateequity.asp 
(Apr. 30, 2020) (“Private equity is composed of funds and investors that directly invest in private companies, or 
that engage in buyouts of public companies, resulting in the delisting of public equity. Institutional and retail 
investors provide the capital for private equity, and the capital can be utilized to fund new technology, make 
acquisitions, expand working capital, and to bolster and solidify a balance sheet.”). 
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may have a connection to the founders.224 Generally, the general public is not 
eligible to invest in the private market because private companies are not 
publicly traded. As a result, access to the private investment market is, in most 
cases, restricted because of the federal securities laws. The import of this 
restriction is that wealthy, elite private actors carry the bulk of the influence with 
respect to entrepreneurship. In protecting the public from themselves, the 
resulting effect of the federal securities laws is that monied and connected 
individuals have an outsized advantage and control with respect to 
entrepreneurship.225  
For the reasons described above in Part I related to lack of diversity, 
heuristics, and the brilliant founder myth, access to capital to launch a startup is 
often limited to those that are of a certain type. As a result, the private markets 
reinforce the existing structures of wealth inequality. While the federal securities 
laws focus on investor protection, accountability, and disclosure, the proxies 
used by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) bar access by 
communities of color to private financial markets. The objective standard used 
by the SEC of using wealth as a proxy for sophistication has the effect of being 
both “under protective of wealthy investors and over protective of non-wealthy 
investors.”226 These race neutral regulations effectively bar most communities 
of color from participating in the private markets and therefore in “opportunities 
to create generational wealth through entrepreneurship and investing,” also 
leaving founders of color underfunded.227 
One of the problems with the private financial markets is that the 
exemptions from registration under the federal securities laws function to restrict 
participants to a small, insular class of mostly white investors. 228  Funding 
streams to entrepreneurs mirror where the wealth already exists, resulting in 
white male entrepreneurs receiving the majority of startup funding. This has 
resulted in disparity in capital raising between founders of color and white 
 
 224. See Cremades, supra note 89 (differentiating between the types of investors that fund startups). 
 225. Musa Al-Gharbi, The 1 Percent Wins Again: How Entrepreneurship—Supposedly the Cornerstone of 
American Society—Favors the Wealthy, SALON (Mar. 20, 2016, 7:59 PM), https://www.salon.com/2016/03/20/ 
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(Nov. 25, 2013, 9:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/11/silicon-valley-isnt-a-meritocracy-and-the-cult-of-
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 226. Kevin G. Bender, Giving the Average Investor the Keys to the Kingdom: How the Federal Securities 
Laws Facilitate Wealth Inequality, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 4 (2016). 
 227. Mariah Lichtenstern, Investors Still Engage in Racist Redlining. Why Haven’t We Done Something 
About It?, FORTUNE (Jan. 6, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/01/06/redlining-black-latinx-
entrepreneurship-investment-sec/; see also Bender, supra note 226, at 3–4. 
 228. See Lyons-Padilla et al., supra note 133, at 17225 (explaining that white men control more than 98.7% 
of global financial assets and that “[o]f the $69.1 trillion global financial assets under management across mutual 
funds, hedge funds, real estate, and private equity, fewer than 1.3% are managed by women and people of 
color”). 
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founders, which has developed over time.229 This disparity in access to capital 
affects all methods of capital raising for entrepreneurs.230  
A. PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTIONS, THE WEALTH GAP, AND THE FALLACY 
OF BOOTSTRAPPING 
Startup financing typically occurs through three investor types—friends 
and family investors, angel investors and venture capital investors—conducted 
through private offerings. Typically, “friends and family” rounds are 
investments from individuals willing to invest their own money ordinarily up to 
$150,000.231 The reference to “friends and family” is because these investors 
usually have a personal relationship with the founders; the investor believes in 
the startup idea or the founder and would probably not make the investment but 
for her relationship with the founder.  
After friends and family, there are angel investments, which are 
investments of up to $2 million typically by wealthy individuals who are either 
entrepreneurs themselves or otherwise have experience investing in early-stage 
companies.232 Angel investors may or may not have a personal relationship with 
the founders, but investment by angel investors is heavily relationship driven.233 
Angel investors typically use their personal funds, which gives them flexibility 
to use nonfinancial as well as financial reasons to invest. They make their 
investment decision based on seeking a return on their investment and having 
the opportunity to mentor a startup founder. Angel investors usually bridge the 
gap between the friends and family round and venture capital rounds.234 Angels 
play an important role in developing startups and as a mechanism for sorting 
new startups that later seek venture capital.235 “Sorting” or screening is often 
 
 229. As a startup lawyer directing an entrepreneurship and community development clinic at Columbia Law 
School, I’ve worked with underrepresented entrepreneurs in several jurisdictions; I know first-hand how 
fundraising works and the challenges faced by entrepreneurs of color. 
 230. See Robert Fairlie, Alicia Robb & David T. Robinson, Black and White: Access to Capital Among 
Minority-Owned Startups (Stan. Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Rsch., Discussion Paper No. 17-03, 2016), 
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/17-003.pdf (“Black-owned businesses are persistently 
smaller and face more difficulty in raising external capital. Large differences in credit worthiness are important 
for explaining the difference. Even controlling for credit worthiness, persistent differences in perceptions of 
treatment by banks are also important. Spatial variation in banking conditions and historical attitudes towards 
race are consistent with racial bias.”). 
 231. How to Raise a Friends and Family Round, FOUNDER INST. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://fi.co/insight/how-
to-raise-a-friends-and-family-round (“A Friends and Family round typically results in anywhere from $10,000 
to $150,000 in funding that allows a startup to get through its first few months of operation.”).  
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Grow, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 12, 2020, 7:45 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-an-angel-investor 
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convertible debt (bonds) or equity (shares) in the company. The term is actually borrowed from show 
business . . . . Plus, many angel groups co-invest with other angel groups, individual angels, and even early-stage 
venture capitalists to make investments of $500,000 to $2 million per round.”). 
 233. Ibrahim, supra note 93, at 1431 (explaining that angel investors are more likely to invest if they know 
the founder and the industry of the startup). 
 234.  Id. at 1428. 
 235.  Id. at 1428–29. 
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facilitated at the angel investor level.236 Entrepreneurs signal the strength of their 
startup idea by how much angel investment they have in their company, since 
“[f]irms which are backed by angel investors are more likely to survive, create 
more jobs, and have a greater chance of successfully exiting the startup phase 
than otherwise comparable firms without this support.”237  According to the 
Center for Venture Research, total angel investments in 2019 were $23.9 billion, 
an increase of 3.2% over 2018, and a total of 63,730 entrepreneurial ventures 
received angel funding in 2019.238  
Venture capital is a term used to describe risky, speculative investments, 
often in early-stage, high-growth technology companies.239 It is a type of private 
financing for startups, where the investor, investment bank, or other financial 
institution believes that the investment has long-term growth potential.240 The 
venture capital firm invests in the startup often by taking a sizable stake in the 
business until a certain point when the startup can be sold to another company 
or sold on the public-equity markets when the venture capital firm can exit and 
get a sizeable return on their investment.241 U.S. venture capital funds set new 
records in deal making, exits, and fundraising in 2020, according to a new report 
from PitchBook and the National Venture Capital Association. “Deal value 
topped $150 billion for the first time, while exit value hit a record $290 billion 
after a surge of public listings in the second half of the year. Meanwhile, new 
venture capital funds raised $73.6 billion, surpassing the 2018 high of $68.1 
billion, according to the report.”242 
All three of the above-described investment types implicate the federal 
securities laws. 
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1. The Racial Effect of the Accredited Investor Rules 
All private offerings (even those made to friends and family) require 
registration with the SEC unless the offering is exempt from registration under 
the federal securities laws.243  Registration with the SEC can be costly and 
burdensome.244 As a result, the vast majority of companies choose to find an 
exemption from registration.245 The easiest and most common exception to the 
registration requirement is the accredited investor rule promulgated under 
Regulation D, which creates an exemption for the offering if all investors are 
accredited investors.246 
Any investment in a private offering is overwhelmingly restricted to 
company insiders, institutional investors, and wealthy individuals or “accredited 
investors.”247 The SEC created the concept of “accredited investors” to mitigate 
the tension in protecting individual investors in private securities offerings and 
 
 243. Investor Bulletin: Private Placements Under Regulation D, SEC (Sept. 24, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_privateplacements.html (“A securities offering exempt 
from registration with the SEC is sometimes referred to as a private placement or an unregistered offering. 
Under the federal securities laws, a company may not offer or sell securities unless the offering has been 
registered with the SEC or an exemption from registration is available.”). 
 244. SEC, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1), https://www.sec.gov/ 
files/forms-1.pdf (listing all of the requirements for eligibility). 
 245. “For example, in 2014 only 3.5% of reported securities offerings were public offerings and only a 
fraction of those were with the required form S-1. The other 96.5% were offerings made pursuant to an exception 
to the registration requirement.” Kyle Hulten, Family and Friends Financing Round: Raising Capital from Non 
Accredited Investors, VIGOR L. GRP.: THE CANAL ST. BLOG, https://www.invigorlaw.com/friends-and-family-
financing-round/ (last visited May 21, 2021). 
 246. 17 CFR § 230.506 (2020). 
 247. Under existing Rule 501, a person qualifies as an accredited investor if he or she is either: 
Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, 
exceeds $1 million. . . .  
[or] who had an income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income 
with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable 
expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year . . . . 
Id. § 230.501. 
 In December 2020, at the time of writing this Article, the SEC adopted amendments to the accredited 
investor rule to add new categories of qualifying natural persons and entities and to make certain other 
modifications to the existing definition. According to the SEC:  
The amendments are intended to update and improve the definition to identify more effectively 
investors that have sufficient knowledge and expertise to participate in investment opportunities 
that do not have the rigorous disclosure and procedural requirements, and related investor 
protections, provided by registration under the Securities Act of 1993.  
Order Designating Certain Professional Licenses as Qualifying Natural Persons for Accredited Investor Status, 
85 Fed. Reg. 64,234, 64,234 (Oct. 9, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).  
The amendments allow investors to qualify as accredited investors based on defined measures of 
professional knowledge, experience, or certifications in addition to the existing tests for income or 
net worth. The amendments also expand the list of entities that may qualify as accredited investors, 
including by allowing any entity that meets an investments test to qualify. 
Press Release, SEC, SEC Modernizes the Accredited Investor Definition (2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press-release/2020-191. 
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promoting investment in private offerings to encourage economic growth.248 
Notably, the SEC does not restrict investment in publicly traded companies.249 
An “accredited investor” is an individual or an entity that is presumed to not 
need the protection of federal or state securities laws based on their income or 
net worth.250 In other words, an accredited investor’s financial sophistication 
and ability to sustain the risk of loss of investment or ability to fend for 
themselves, as evidenced by their wealth, ostensibly renders the protections of 
the federal securities laws’ registration process unnecessary. 251  Wealth is 
therefore a “proxy for sophistication.”252 Qualifying as an accredited investor is 
significant because accredited investors may, under SEC rules, participate in 
investment opportunities that are generally not available to non-accredited 
investors or “ordinary investors,” such as investments in private companies and 
offerings by hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds.253  
The SEC’s “accredited investor standard” effectively means that only those 
with at least $1 million in assets or $200,000 in annual income can participate 
in private offerings.254 Simply put, an accredited investor is someone who is 
quite wealthy. Accredited investor status is required for certain investments, 
such as angel investments, hedge funds, private equity, and others.255 Because 
of the nature of private fundraising mechanisms and exemptions, the accredited 
investor standard has the effect of restricting most (87%) Americans from 
investment opportunities in Silicon Valley startups, or any startups for that 
matter.256 The rules and regulations assume that only well-off individuals can 
 
 248. Michael L. Monson, The Evolution and Future of the Accredited Investor Standard for Individuals, 23 
UTAH BAR J.. Nov./Dec. 2010, at 36, 38. 
 249. See Paulina Likos, How to Invest in the Private Market, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 26, 2021, 3:56 
PM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing-101/articles/how-to-invest-in-the-private-market. 
 250. Id. at 37.  
 251. Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans, 52 Fed. Reg. 3,015, 3,015–
22 (Jan. 30, 1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239) (stating that the accredited investor standard is 
“intended to encompass those persons whose financial sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of loss of 
investment or ability to fend for themselves render the protections of the Securities Act’s registration process 
unnecessary.”); see also Fan, supra note 9, at 592 (“The theory behind Regulation D is that accredited investors 
are financially sophisticated and therefore do not need the protections of the securities laws.”). 
 252. Syed Haq, Comment, Revisiting the Accredited Investor Standard, 5 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL 
L. REV. 59, 69 (2015); see also Renee M. Jones, Essay, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 66 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 
165, 186 (2017). 
 253. James Garrett Baldwin, How to Become an Accredited Investor, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/092815/how-become-accredited-investor.asp (Dec. 28, 2020) 
(“[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allows companies and private funds to skip the need to 
register certain investments as long as the firms sell these assets to accredited investors. Accredited investors are 
able to invest money directly into the lucrative world of private equity, private placements, hedge funds, venture 
capital, and equity crowdfunding.” (footnote omitted)). 
 254. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.508 (2020). 
 255. Alexis Rhiannon, Accredited Investors Have Access to Complex, Loosely Regulated Investments—
Here’s What It Takes to Qualify, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2021, 9:12 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
accredited-investor (“[O]nce you become accredited, it ‘unlocks’ access to products not available to the general 
public, such as hedge funds, venture capital funds, private equity funds, and angel investing.”). 
 256. Era Anagnosti, Colin J. Diamond, David Johansen & John R. Vetterli, SEC: Time to Revamp Securities 
Offering Exemptions, LEXOLOGY (July 23, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5945214c-
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assess information to evaluate investment and they are sophisticated as 
evidenced by their wealth. As of 2015, 13% of households qualified as 
accredited investors under Rule 501(a)(6) of Regulation D.257 Of those, only 
1.3% are Black and 2.8% are Latinx.258 “For [an entrepreneur] whose networks 
are largely rooted in Black and Latinx communities, that means less than 1% of 
the people ‘like them’ are allowed to invest freely.”259 In writing about her 
concerns regarding the accredited investor exemption generally, Professor Usha 
Rodrigues writes that, “the private and public markets have now grown radically 
disconnected and unequal.”260 The reason the SEC originally implemented such 
restrictive investor rules is because the SEC likely feared the majority of the 
population would be unsophisticated in their investments, sinking their savings 
into untested companies and losing money.261 But the justification does not hold 
up when you realize that even certified public accountants, people with very high 
levels of proven competence and training, might not qualify today as an 
accredited investor without satisfying the minimum net worth requirement.262 In 
the name of investor protection, the accredited investor rules bar the majority of 
communities of color from accessing opportunity for wealth formation.  
Very little has been written on how these rules exacerbate racial and 
economic inequalities. While the SEC paternalistically attempts to distinguish 
between who can fend for themselves and who cannot, the real impact of the 
federal securities may be felt in the communities of color who, due to their 
economic status, are generally unable to access these markets.263 What is at stake 
is equality of opportunity to grow and accumulate wealth. This phenomenon is 
a problem because the federal securities laws represent government regulation 
that perpetuates the ability for the wealthy to become wealthier and facilitates 
inequity in the opportunity to access the private financial markets. 
 
2. General Solicitation 
In addition to the accredited investor standard, before 2012 when the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”) was passed, the 
 
f980-4f26-a3ba-fdce62e42ae0; see also PK, How Many Accredited Investors Are There in America? (2016), 
DQYDJ (Oct. 7, 2020), https://dqydj.com/2016-accredited-investors-in-america/ (“We estimate in 2016 there 
were 12,417,040 Accredited Investor Households in America, 9.86% of all American Households.”). 
 257. Anagnosti et al., supra note 256. 
 258. Lichtenstern, supra note 227. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3413 (2013). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Under the new rules, the SEC has determined that those with Series 7, 63, or 83 licenses qualify as 
accredited investors based on those licenses alone. See Press Release, supra note 247. Those with CFA and CFP 
designations have been considered as have licensed CPAs and attorneys, but ultimately those designations and 
licenses were not included in the new rule. Mat Sorensen, SEC Expands Accredited Investor Rule, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/355590. 
 263. Leah Duncan, Arbitrary Paternalism and the SEC Accredited-Investor Standard, BLOG: MICH. J. RACE 
& L. (Dec. 4, 2018), https://mjrl.org/2018/12/04/arbitrary-paternalism-and-the-sec-accredited-investor-
standard. 
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federal securities laws prohibited the general solicitation of the public in 
securities offerings. 264  Most of the exemptions from registration prohibit 
companies from engaging in general solicitation or general advertising—
advertising in newspapers or on the Internet to the public in connection with 
securities offerings.265 In other words, before 2012, private companies were only 
allowed to raise money from accredited investors and from those whom they had 
a substantial pre-existing relationship with or to whom they were introduced via 
a registered broker-dealer. The rationale for the ban on general solicitation was 
to protect unsophisticated investors from fraud due to lack of information, lack 
of education, or problematic disclosures.266  
After 2012, the JOBS Act limited the removal of the ban on general 
solicitation. Primarily aimed at entrepreneurs seeking capital, the JOBS Act 
theoretically increases the ability of small businesses and startups to access 
capital and generate jobs through the use of crowdfunding.267 Crowdfunding has 
the potential to mitigate some of the disparities between businesses that have 
access to capital and those that do not.268 The reality, however, is that investment 
crowdfunding is not likely to democratize entrepreneurship. Given the extensive 
SEC regulatory requirements, it is unlikely that entrepreneurs will turn to 
investment crowdfunding to raise capital.269  The JOBS Act was enacted to 
reduce regulatory burdens and increase initial public offerings (IPOs). 
According to Professor Renee Jones, the JOBS Act likely had the opposite effect 
and contributed to a new governance problem by “creating a class of 
unaccountable unicorns.”270 
It is difficult to determine the demographics of accredited investors, but 
investors in private and public offerings seem to be in the same category as in 
the private equity and venture capital space. In recent years, investment is very 
 
 264. Fact Sheet: Proposing Amendments to Private Offering Rules, SEC (July 10, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-124-item3.htm (“In April 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS Act directs the SEC to remove the prohibition 
on general solicitation or general advertising for securities offerings relying on Rule 506 provided that sales are 
limited to accredited investors and an issuer takes reasonable steps to verify that all purchasers of the securities 
are accredited investors.”). 
 265. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2020). For calculation purposes, the value of primary residence is excluded.  
 266. See Erin Griffith, Does General Solicitation Matter for Tech Startups? Not Really, PANDO (July 10, 
2013), https://pando.com/2013/07/10/does-general-solicitation-matter-for-tech-startups-not-really. 
 267. See Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 217, 220 (2015). 
 268. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 619–20 (2015) 
(“[C]rowdfunding can democratize the market for financing speculative companies by inviting ordinary 
people—‘digital shareholders’—to make investments that are currently offered solely to accredited (wealthy) 
investors.”). 
 269. See Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, What’s Wrong with Jumpstart(ing) Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act?, 
16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 185, 191 (2019) (“[W]hile laudable steps have been taken to democratize the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem by implementing crowdfunding, isolated regulation such as the JOBS Act will do 
little to support entrepreneurs in their startup ventures, resulting in grave effects on this country’s entrepreneurial 
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 270. Jones, supra note 252, at 170.  
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homogenous; venture capitalists, who are accredited investors and often lead the 
charge in early-stage investing, are 89% male.271 According to the National 
Venture Capital Association/Deloitte Human Capital Survey, racial and ethnic 
groups are underrepresented in the Venture Capital workforce. Only 17% 
identified as Asian, with 4% identifying as African American, and 5% as 
Latino. 272  It’s against that backdrop that venture capitalists choose their 
collaborators at other firms, investing their money side by side and joining the 
boards that guide the startups. Most investors specialize in a particular industry 
or sector, so potential partners are easy for researchers like us to identify: They 
are investing in the same types of deals at around the same time. And “venture 
capitalists are far more likely to partner with people if they share their gender or 
race.”273 There is a lack of data showing the demographics of investors strictly 
involved in private placement.  
Based on Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, it seems unlikely that general 
solicitation meaningfully increases the percentage of investors of color. The rule 
“permits issuers to broadly solicit and generally advertise an offering, provided 
that (1) all purchasers in the offering are accredited investors.” This confines 
eligible investors to the categories mentioned above. Due to the level of wealth 
disparity in our country in relation of race, it is unlikely that the requirements of 
general solicitation help increase the percentage of investors of color. This is the 
landscape on which startups incubate, operate, and scale on the path to creating 
a unicorn. Entrepreneurs are required to raise money in a very insular and 
homogenous private investment market. The effect of these rules is economic 
exclusion of people of color. Nonaccredited investors miss out on the privilege 
of investing in the private market, and entrepreneurs miss out on benefiting from 
their potential investment. 
3. The Wealth Gap and Its Implications for Bootstrapping  
This country has a profound and seemingly insurmountable wealth gap that 
falls along racial lines. “Differences in economic outcomes by race have 
persisted for centuries in the United States and continue up to the present day. 
For example, in 2016, the median household income of black Americans was 
$39,500, compared with $65,000 for non-Hispanic white Americans.” 274 
According to the Federal Reserve, in 2016, the median wealth of white families 
was ten times the wealth of Black families and eight times that of Latino 
families. 275  This wealth gap affects entrepreneurship in profound ways. 
 
 271. DELOITTE, supra note 116, at 6.  
 272. Id. at 8.  
 273. Paul Gompers & Silpa Kovvali, The Other Diversity Dividend, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 2018), 
https://hbr.org/2018/07/the-other-diversity-dividend. 
 274. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones & Sonya R. Porter, Race and Economic Opportunity 
in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective, 135 Q.J. ECON. 711, 712 (2020) (citations omitted). 
 275. Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, How Wealth Inequality Has Changed in the U.S. Since the Great 
Recession, by Race, Ethnicity and Income, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
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Although the numbers are on the rise, successful founders of color are largely 
absent in entrepreneurship, citing a lack of access to capital compared to their 
white counterparts.276 The wealth disparity has implications for bootstrapping, 
the traditional path outside of seeking private investment that entrepreneurs take 
toward fundraising.277 The expectation of bootstrapping and relying on friends 
and family stems from bias toward wealth. However, when entrepreneurs of 
color reach out to their friends and family for the seed capital to initially fund 
their venture, they are already behind their white counterparts because of the 
wealth and income gap.278 Bootstrapping and fundraising through their social 
network is essentially a myth for entrepreneurs of color. With the limits on 
generational wealth, it is unlikely that the friends and family of entrepreneurs of 
color can invest on the level of their white counterparts.  
It is hard for entrepreneurs of color to fundraise as evidenced by how few 
founders of color receive private investment. Beyond bootstrapping, minority 
women founders make up only 3% of all U.S. angel-backed deals, and minority 
men were 13% of all U.S. angel-backed deals in 2019.279 Further, in 2018, just 
3% of venture capitalists are Black, 1% are Latinx, and 18% of all venture 
capitalists are women.280  
White (mostly male) entrepreneurs have more access to capital than any 
other group. As of 2017, only sixteen Black women-led companies had raised 
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women represented 0.06% of the $424.7 billion in total venture funding raised 
since 2009, and a majority of that funding was raised in 2017.282 Juxtapose this 
with Elizabeth Holmes, who took her college tuition money from her parents 
and leveraged that trust fund to make her first million.283 Holmes had access to 
all kinds of accredited investors in her network. One of her first investors, for 
example, Tim Draper, of famed venture capital firm Draper Fisher Jurvetson, 
was a family friend.284 This Subpart described how the structures of financing 
restrict access to the rich, white and privileged. The next Subpart describes how 
cultural capital creates circles of power among the wealthy and elite.  
B. CULTURAL CAPITAL 
Financial capital is a big part of startup success, but so is a form of hidden 
capital or cultural capital. Cultural capital is the background, occupation, gender, 
age, education, or other aspect about a person that gives them access to certain 
social groups or status.285 Accessing cultural capital can lead to opportunities 
and advantages gained for possessing cultural capital.286 Entrepreneurs often 
have success because they are able to tap into this cultural capital.287 Beyond 
financial capital, cultural capital shapes the entrepreneurship game and 
influences who achieves success and who does not. The hidden nature of cultural 
capital means that some groups benefit unfairly from possessing it when others 
do not. In Silicon Valley, whiteness and maleness are undeniable assets. If an 
entrepreneur happens to be white, male, wealthy, and college-educated, cultural 
capital will probably get that entrepreneur in front of more venture capitalists 
and investors than an entrepreneur who is not all of those things. If that 
entrepreneur attended Harvard or Stanford, then that entrepreneur has even more 
access to cultural capital than most.288 Richard Kerby found that in a study of 
about 1,500 venture investors, forty percent of venture investors attended 
Stanford or Harvard.289 The implications of this are complicated. There is danger 
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in the idea that a handful of universities, alums, and affiliates control the startup 
economy. This phenomenon makes startup culture a closed community for a 
certain brand of endorsed elites.290 The money and power are flowing among 
people who already have it.291 
Cultural capital is born out of systemic racial and social inequality. The use 
of cultural capital “illuminates how the rich and well connected occupy different 
strata of life, enjoy a completely different set of opportunities from the rest of 
us, experience a different kind of justice, and are so often immune from 
consequences.”292 The problem with capitalizing on cultural capital is that there 
is little vetting that occurs when you take advantage of these relationships. The 
next Subpart describes how the market incentivizes racism among the actors in 
the financial system.  
C. MARKET INCENTIVES DRIVE RACIST AND CLASSIST OUTCOMES 
Defenders of Silicon Valley culture may raise several counterarguments 
about the central premise of this Article. These arguments may include that 
current norms are optimally designed to incent innovation; that some founders 
truly are visionaries that improve society even if they create toxic work 
environments; that the market is the most efficient way to allocate resources and 
should consider distributional equity; and finally, that the lack of diversity in 
Silicon Valley is merely a pipeline problem. Yet, there are many examples of 
the ways that a lack of representation of communities of color in the startup 
space is connected to structural racism. Brief and explicit engagement with these 
arguments may help convince the reader that a deeper problem lies within the 
culture of Silicon Valley itself. This Article specifically references Silicon 
Valley, but the themes discussed in this Article have implications beyond a 
critique of Silicon Valley. Fundamentally, this critique of a purported 
meritocracy can be applied to every place in society that says it operates as a 
meritocracy—for example, college admissions, tech company workplaces, and 
even legal academia. The larger lesson to be drawn from Theranos is that we 
need to care about these issues in Silicon Valley, not just for the health of our 
economy, but for the health of society. 
Economic racism shuts out communities of color from startup investment 
opportunities. Ventures owned by people of color lack sufficient funding, 
typically due to lack of access to venture capital and/or small business loans.293 
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Underfunding limits a business’ ability to launch, scale, and grow. Limitations 
on fundraising and access to capital is one part of the problem.294 But the system 
in place for creating and supporting entrepreneurs favors white males at the 
outset.  
There is deep bias within the Silicon Valley community that manifests as 
racism. The economic racism experienced by entrepreneurs of color is not likely 
to be addressed, since it occurs in the private market space.295 There is no legal 
strategy to ensure that people of color have an equal opportunity to share in 
wealth creation. In fact, fighting economic discrimination is a difficult legal 
battle. The facts underlying the case in Comcast Corp. v. National Association 
of African American-Owned Media is analogous here. In that case, Byron Allen, 
who is Black and the founder of Entertainment Studios, sued cable television 
companies Comcast and Charter after the providers refused to carry Allen’s 
channels.296 Allen alleged claims of racial discrimination under § 1981 of the 
Civil Rights Act,297 which, among other things, gives all races an equal right to 
make and enforce contracts.298 The statute also requires proving that defendants 
were not just biased, but intentionally racist. 299  In its complaint, Allen’s 
company, Entertainment Studios, presented specific factual allegations 
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supporting its claim that Comcast was motivated by racial discrimination in 
refusing to carry Entertainment Studios’ channels.300 The question before the 
Supreme Court was whether, in addition to pleading that racial discrimination 
was a “motivating factor” for Comcast’s conduct, Entertainment Studios also 
had to plead that Comcast’s racial discrimination was the but-for cause of its 
denial of a contract right to Entertainment Studios.301 Comcast argued that Allen 
must prove Entertainment Studios would have earned the contract, were it not 
for race.302 The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with Comcast and rejected 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s approach that it was sufficient to 
allege that race was a “motivating factor” for the denial of the contract, in favor 
of a “but-for” test for causation.303 As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recognized 
in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the but-for test 
“demand[s] the impossible.”304 
The Comcast ruling has implications not only for entrepreneurs in Silicon 
Valley alleging discrimination, but for future civil rights litigation. There is now 
an even higher standard to prove racial discrimination in Silicon Valley. Instead 
of considering the statistical evidence that reveals the racial disparity for Black 
entrepreneurs, courts will more likely weigh their decisions based on a 
hypothetical situation in which the plaintiff’s racial identity is erased and all 
other factors remain the same. This dangerously narrows the interpretation of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.305 Silicon Valley investors and leaders will rely on 
the heightened standard when facing a claim of discrimination from 
entrepreneurs of color. 
D. THERANOS HIGHLIGHTS STRUCTURAL BIAS AND INEQUALITY IN THE 
PRIVATE MARKET SYSTEM 
The story of Theranos provides an opportunity to examine the ways that 
cultural capital influences entrepreneurship. Elizabeth Holmes held tremendous 
amounts of cultural capital that she was able to leverage in order to catapult her 
company into a unicorn. The idea that a nineteen-year-old college dropout with 
very limited chemical engineering training and no medical training could invent 
something as game-changing as what Theranos claimed it had done defies belief. 
But Elizabeth Holmes was believed. Not only was she believed, but she was 
 
 300. Id. at 1014. 
 301. Id.  
 302. Id. at 1013. 
 303. Id. at 1014–15.  
 304. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wex S. 
Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 67 (1956)). 
 305. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Major Step Backwards for Civil Rights: Comcast v. National Association 
of African American-Owned Media, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/a-major-step-backwards-for-
civil-rights-comcast-v-national-association-of-african-american-owned-media/ (last visited May 21, 2021) 
(“Obviously, the Court’s decision in Comcast will make it more difficult for § 1981 plaintiffs to withstand a 
motion to dismiss and ultimately to prevail. Alleging and proving but-for causation is much harder than alleging 
and proving that race was a motivating factor in the denial of the contract.”). 
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revered as a once-in-a-generation genius. One of the reasons why no one was 
skeptical of her is because she had tapped into her cultural capital and was 
vouched for by a trusted friend. It is also worth emphasizing here that Holmes 
made herself and indeed was the face and a key gatekeeper at Theranos. This 
was not an instance where someone with the connections, financial backing, and 
managerial skills worked to build bridges and bring the requisite expertise in the 
room. She, along with Balwani, cast themselves and indeed operated as the 
experts in the room. 
There has been some commentary that Theranos’ Board and investors were 
seduced by Elizabeth Holmes because she was a young, beautiful woman,306 but 
I would argue that if they were seduced at all, they were likely seduced by her 
Stanford pedigree. Many of the company’s Board members and investors were 
fellows at the Hoover Institute, former cabinet members, and military officers, 
including George Shultz, James Mattis, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, Sam 
Nunn, and Gary Roughead.307 They all had some type of connection to Stanford 
University.308  
Stanford University has produced more unicorn founders than any other 
university and to this day continues to play a large role in creating unicorns.309 
A connection to Stanford carries significant cultural capital and connections to 
the elite, monied, influential actors within Silicon Valley.310 Elizabeth Holmes, 
who was not even a Stanford graduate, but a dropout, was able to tap into the 
incredible resources of the Stanford entrepreneurial ecosystem and gain access 
 
 306. See, e.g., Leah Garchik, Money, Medicine and a Good-Looking Woman: The Fall of Theranos, S.F. 
CHRON. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/leahgarchik/article/Money-medicine-and-a-good-
looking-woman-the-13687000.php (“Holmes is a glamorous young woman, whose intense blue-eyed stare (she 
never blinked, said a Theranos employee) and trademark black turtlenecks were much admired in Silicon Valley. 
This, it was agreed upon in a panel discussion that followed the showing [of the Theranos HBO documentary], 
was part of the lure for investors and board members, most of whom—George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Rupert 
Murdoch among them—were older men, seduced not only by her self-proclaimed genius but also by her youth 
and looks.”). 
 307. Richard Beales, How Theranos Hoovered up $9 Bln of Influence, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2015), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS334041731220151027; Pflanzer, supra note 148. 
 308. See McKenna, supra note 208 (“Theranos investor list is a who’s-who of Stanford University 
alumni . . . .”). 
 309. In March 2019, Bloomberg reported that more than one out of ten unicorn founders went to Stanford. 
Sophie Alexander & Reade Pickert, The Good and the Bad of Stanford’s Massively Successful Startup Scene, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-10/dreamers-and-dropouts-
stories-from-stanford-cradle-of-unicorns; see also Larry Kim, Billion-Dollar Unicorn Founders Came from 
These Universities, in Case You Were Curious, MEDIUM (Mar. 20, 2018), https://medium.com/marketing-and-
entrepreneurship/billion-dollar-unicorn-founders-came-from-these-universities-in-case-you-were-curious-
398665cc82c4 (“The top school on the list, Stanford University, claims 51 unicorn founders as alumni while 
runner-up Harvard University has 37.”). 
 310. See Ritika Trikha, The Interdependency of Stanford and Silicon Valley, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 4, 2015, 
5:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/04/what-will-stanford-be-without-silicon-valley (“In return, its 
entrepreneurial alumni offer among the most generous endowments to the university, breaking the record as the 
first university to add more than $1 billion in a single year. Stanford shares a relationship with Silicon Valley 
unlike any other university on the planet, chartering a self-perpetuating cycle of innovation.”). 
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to those who would become her advisors, investors, board members, and 
employees.  
Confirmation bias born out of cultural capital was a phenomenon that 
played out in the media as well. In 2014, she landed a cover story with Fortune 
Magazine. John Carreyrou wrote that since the author of the piece that publicly 
launched her and Theranos into stardom, Roger Parloff, the writer for Fortune, 
“didn’t have the expertise to vet her scientific claims, Parloff interviewed and 
effectively relied on the dominant members of her Board of Directors as 
character witnesses.”311 
Since she was childhood friends with the daughter of billionaire venture 
capitalist Tim Draper, she was able to raise her first million dollars.312 The 
investment by Tim Draper ostensibly gave her credibility for future investors. 
Once other investors saw Draper’s endorsement, they were eager to invest; it did 
not seem to matter that health tech venture capital firms had passed on the 
venture. 313  Through tapping into the cultural capital afforded her by her 
connection to Stanford, Elizabeth Holmes had a level of access to investors and 
venture capital that is atypical for most startup founders in this country.314 At 
the age of twenty-two, she was pitching to Novartis;315 at twenty-five, she was 
pitching to the Safeway and Walgreens CEOs to develop hundred-million-dollar 
deals that would put Theranos in Safeway and Walgreens stores.316 That access 
to those stores then led her to use those pitches to increase the valuation of her 
company to $165 million based on deals with pharmaceutical companies (note 
that these deals did not actually exist).317 Theranos raised $700 million of private 
investment money from 2003 to 2015.318 By 2014, the company was valued at 
$9 billion, and Holmes was lauded as the first woman billionaire tech founder.319 
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The list of investors in Theranos was made up of heavy hitters (for 
example, the DeVos Family, Rupert Murdoch, and the Walton Family), all of 
whom had heard about the investment by word of mouth.320 Elizabeth Holmes 
raised hundreds of millions of dollars from investors enchanted by her pitch. 
More significantly, the investors had access to the investment because their 
wealthy friends and connections knew about it. If this was a good investment 
opportunity, it would have made these investors a lot more money, perpetuating 
circles of wealth and power, and the ordinary investors would not have had 
access to the investment opportunity.  
Besides perpetuating and contributing to structural privilege, the problem 
with Elizabeth Holmes tapping into the cultural capital afforded to her because 
of her connection to Stanford is that her company and its claims were given the 
benefit of the doubt because of how class functions to reinforce perceptions of 
Holmes as a mythic entrepreneur.  
Startup culture’s tacit endorsement of Elizabeth Holmes was pivotal to her 
success. Arguably, Holmes cultivated Theranos and her persona to conform to 
startup culture and secure this endorsement. She created the company in the 
heart of Silicon Valley on Stanford’s campus, and then moved offices to inhabit 
Facebook’s former headquarters. She got the idea for her company while she 
was at Stanford University studying biomedical engineering. In a culture where 
hyping your product to get funding while also concealing its true developmental 
progress and hoping reality catches up to that hype is normative and there is 
private investment available in abundance to Stanford-affiliated founders of 
ventures disrupting industries, it is easy to see why Holmes was able to raise so 
much money so easily. Fraud and deception aside, the startup culture created by 
Silicon Valley and the common methods of fundraising, the homogeneity of the 
Board, groupthink, implicit bias, pattern matching, and certain opportunities that 
are concentrated within an elite circle generated an environment out of which 
Theranos was born.  
Despite her disgrace, the capital-raising success of Elizabeth Holmes, who 
created a unicorn company in ten years’ time, remains a lesson in the ways that 
race, privilege, and wealth dictate startup success and perpetuates itself within 
circles of power. Most entrepreneurs do not have access to the traditionally 
 
 320. See Reed Abelson & Katie Thomas, Caught in the Theranos Wreckage: Betsy DeVos, Rupert Murdoch 
and Walmart’s Waltons, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/health/theranos-
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their due diligence on its product”). Powerful and rich investors brought in their rich and powerful friends to 
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white, male networks that Holmes relied on for funding, and most investors do 
not have access to the private market of pre-IPO startups. 
III.  ADVANCING RACIAL EQUITY AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION IN THE 
STARTUP SPACE 
 The themes raised in this Article are informed by the racial wealth divide, 
which has been created and maintained by public policies that span the history 
of this country. Economic racism and the implicit bias prevalent within Silicon 
Valley will not change without structural reforms to the private financial markets 
system. However, a detailed discussion of policy proposals is outside of the 
scope of this Article. Instead, offered below is a discussion of the necessity to 
find a path forward with some ideas of areas for consideration, which fall into 
the following categories: the potential of legal reform, the potential of 
government programming, and the potential of private actors. 
A. THE POTENTIAL OF LEGAL REFORMS 
 The downfall of the Theranos fraud is significant beyond the collateral 
financial cost to its large investors. Theranos’ downfall had a domino effect 
affecting its employees and the patients upon which the product was used. The 
company’s fraud put ordinary consumers at risk, and it begs the question of what 
the role should be of the government in the regulation of unicorn companies. It 
is worth exploring the need for heightened regulatory oversight of certain 
investment bodies, including venture capital firms or of board membership of 
large, privately held companies. The private markets have demonstrated being 
incapable of making changes without an intervention. If the government starts 
to regulate unicorns and others who aspire to the unicorn designation, those 
companies may begin to implement such strategies when they are startups rather 
than waiting until they reach unicorn status. Perhaps such exploration might 
reveal the need to replicate nationally some of the various state laws described 
below that were implemented in an effort to diversify private company boards. 
1. Federal Regulation 
 The SEC is already watching companies that stay private and are not 
subject to extensive securities law disclosures required of public companies.321 
Beyond watching the companies, it may prove useful for the government to 
begin to compile and analyze data relevant to unicorn companies, which would 
include data about the diversity of the companies, their boards, and their 
investors.  
 
 321. See Lizetta Chapman & Kartikay Mehrotra, Investors Warn Unicorns: Share Info Evenly or Get Sued, 
Bloomberg (June 13, 2016, 2:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-13/investors-warn-
unicorns-share-information-evenly-or-get-sued; see also Kevin M. LaCroix, SEC Warning: It Is Watching 
Private Companies, D&O DIARY (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.dandodiary.com/2016/04/articles/securities-
laws/11893/. 
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2. State Regulation 
Selecting board members in tech startups is an informal process where 
“candidates advertise themselves [and] founders ask around . . . . And given the 
demographics of Silicon Valley’s elite, it has favored white men.” 322 
Diversification in board composition has been a trending topic and has been a 
recent focus of the SEC as well as regulators in various states.323 Changes made 
at the state level to diversify the make-up of the boards of private companies 
could have potential to bring about change to the status quo. For example, the 
state of California passed a new law 324  requiring that public corporations 
incorporated in California or whose principal executive offices are located in 
California have a mandated minimum number of female directors.325 Five other 
states (Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Ohio) have passed 
nonbinding resolutions urging companies in their states to add women to their 
boards.326 According to the most recent report by the California Secretary of 
State, around fifty percent of public companies in California are compliant with 
the gender rule.327 
B. THE POTENTIAL OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 
 The ways that economic racism has effectively shut out communities of 
color from startup investment opportunities is deeply troubling and the evidence 
provided above paints a clear need for change. As illustrated above, 
entrepreneurs of color are not likely to have access to capital and networks that 
might yield investments. Possible solutions to consider might be the creation of 
fund structures that replicate “friends and family” investments for lower-income 
and lower-wealth entrepreneurs. Additionally, something worthy of 
considerations are programs that formalize mechanisms to mentor and support 
entrepreneurs of color. 
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C. POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATE MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
 The major focus of this Article has been on the private actors who funded 
Theranos and who are largely responsible for crowning unicorns. For those 
individuals or companies who wish to mitigate some of what has been described 
in this Article,328 I offer a few considerations: invest in founders of color, put 
people of color on boards, and embrace antiracism as a guiding principle.329 In 
this Article, I have situated the problem in the context of cognitive biases and 
market-based incentives in Silicon Valley that have led to economic racism. 
Firms and investors interested in changing the phenomenon described herein 
might wish to counteract bias by evaluating their portfolios, examining the 
percentages of women and founders of color-led businesses, and increasing 
those numbers. They may also wish to expand and develop concrete criteria for 
evaluating investment opportunities and founders in a way that moves away 
from pattern matching or valuing entrepreneurs based on their pedigree, 
changing their frame of reference and focusing on the opportunity. Additionally, 
limited partners who invest in a particular fund of a venture capital firm could 
insist on language in their respective limited partnership agreements to 
encourage the venture capital firm to invest in companies led by founders of 
color. 
CONCLUSION 
Silicon Valley, a fifty-square-mile region in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
“has created more wealth than any place in human history.”330 Given the wealth 
creation derived from Silicon Valley, it is hard to make a case for changing the 
culture, but in the end representation matters. It is necessary to tear down the 
post-racial myth of unicorns and show the places where homogeneity and lack 
of diversity create and perpetuate inequity.  
As of the writing of this Article, the country is in the middle of a global 
pandemic, due to the spread of the coronavirus, and a racial reckoning, which 
includes a racial economic reckoning for our institutions. Racial equity is tied to 
economic inclusion and economic opportunity. Some of that reckoning is 
happening now, or has happened relatively recently, with respect to Silicon 
Valley’s prized unicorns. The Theranos trials are approaching, WeWork 
unraveled most recently, and Uber has been under fire especially in the past three 
to four years. In addition to that economic reckoning, the global coronavirus 
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pandemic will have an effect on the issues raised in this Article. The coronavirus 
crisis is compounding the deeply-entrenched inequities in our society—
inequities rooted in structural racism. Businesses owned by people of color have 
been affected the most.331 In thinking about the state of entrepreneurship post-
pandemic, the concepts explored in this Article regarding institutional bias 
should very much be front and center, particularly as ventures owned by 
founders of color will be disproportionately impacted by the ongoing economic 
crisis rooted in the pandemic. 332  What will be needed are real, concrete 
solutions. Efforts cannot be band-aid solutions to a gaping economic wound. 
The underrepresentation of people of color in the entrepreneurship 
ecosystem represents the loss of a multi-billion-dollar business opportunity.333 
The barriers to entry are structural and cultural for entrepreneurs of color, and 
the loss is incalculable in ways that are not quantifiable. Professor Jennifer Fan 
raises a prescient question: “for all the wonderful new technology and 
innovations that have been brought by [technology companies], how many more 
could we have had if entrepreneurs and investors came from different 
backgrounds?”334 We can only imagine what innovations might have occurred 
if people of color enjoyed equal access to capital and opportunity such as those 
of their white counterparts.  
 Addressing the racial disparity in capital raising is particularly imperative 
as the United States becomes a majority-minority country by 2040.335 How we 
make capital available to entrepreneurs can have significant material 
consequences in the market. With 82% of the industry being male, nearly 60% 
of the industry being white and male, and 40% of the industry coming from just 
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two academic institutions,336  the culture needs to be less insular and more 
diverse.  
The story of Elizabeth Holmes could not be a more intriguing story. The 
massive fraud and the drama around the inner workings of the company make 
for great entertainment.337 But fraud and deception have happened before in 
Silicon Valley and it is certainly likely to happen again.338 While the SEC and 
the federal courts will deal with Elizabeth Holmes and Sunny Balwani as the 
source of the fraud, how the structures in place and the culture of pursuing 
unicorn status at all costs contribute to and enable fraud and deception should 
also be examined. The stories around startup culture and the private investment 
market and the structural bias inherent therein converge in the figure of Holmes 
and her failed startup, Theranos, as a cautionary tale. The massive fraud by 
Theranos appears to be an outlier, but its implications are vast. As startups and 
their investors seek to model themselves after and replicate the successes of past 
unicorn companies and their founders, it is worth examining, and indeed, 
changing the culture of the startup ecosystem. There remains a lot of work to do 
to make entrepreneurship more equitable.  
  
 
 336. Kerby, supra note 280. 
 337. In May 2018, John Carreyrou released the book Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup. 
CARREYROU, supra note 16. As of June 2018, a film version was in the works starring Hollywood film Jennifer 
Lawrence as Elizabeth Holmes. Dana Rose Falcone, Everything to Know About the Elizabeth Holmes Movie 
Starring Jennifer Lawrence, PEOPLE (Mar. 22, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://people.com/movies/elizabeth-holmes-
theranos-jennifer-lawrence-movie/. In January 2019, ABC News Nightline released a podcast and documentary 
about the Holmes story called The Dropout, and HBO released the documentary The Inventor: Out for Blood in 
Silicon Valley about Holmes and Theranos, which made its official debut at the Sundance Film Festival in Park 
City, Utah, on January 24, 2019. See ABC News, The Dropout (Jan. 15, 2019) (downloaded using iTunes); The 
Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley, supra note 24. 
 338. See 16 of the Biggest Alleged Startup Frauds of All Time, CB INSIGHTS (May 23, 2019), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/biggest-startup-frauds (“There’s almost always an element of ‘fake it ’till 
you make it’ for a successful, disruptive startup. Some companies just push their luck a little too far. When that’s 
happened, some companies survive. Others are forced to rebrand in an attempt to distance themselves from the 
notoriety of their founders. And others disappear forever.”). 
1510 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1453 
*** 
